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ABSTRACT
Over the course of the American Civil War, thousands of soldiers deserted the 
ranks of the Union armies. Of these men, some 147 were tried and convicted of the 
crime and executed in front of their peers. Although the number o f victims shot was 
small, the reactions of soldiers and civilians to executions of deserters suggests that 
Northerners often rejected the growing authority of the military and state during the Civil 
War.
From 1861 to 1865, the Federal government significantly grew in size and power 
in order to meet the needs of civil war. Part of this expansion was a radical 
transformation of the military's traditional police system, the Provost Marshal. In both 
the army and on the home front, the Provost Marshal was allowed to exert enormous 
influence that brought soldiers and civilians under close scrutiny and discipline. Such 
control was epitomized by the military execution of a deserter.
These military executions were organized entirely around their intended effect on 
the audience. The prisoner was shot so the army could demonstrate its complete power 
over all citizens. By being executed, the victim's body was transformed into a symbol of 
helplessness before the will of the state. Soldiers were lined up in a hollow square to 
witness their comrade's final moments; few left the site without a firm understanding of 
the army’s complete control over their bodies.
However, contrary to the state’s desire, many Northerners came to reject these 
executions of deserters. A large number of soldiers came to view the spectacles as cruel, 
unjust, and unfit for American society. Citizens on the home front echoed these 
sentiments, as more Northerners felt the military ought not to have such control over 
people. Moreover, as the execution of deserters was the ultimate symbol of the state’s 
power over individuals, Northerners used their protest of the death penalty to express a 
wider rejection of the government’s expanding power.
In certain cases, pressure from citizens even forced the army to change its 
treatment o f deserters. While these incidents are few, they illustrate how Northerners 
could influence their government and check its power.
vi
UNION DESERTER EXECUTIONS AND THE LIMITS 
OF STATE AUTHORITY
INTRODUCTION
PRIVATE PARKER WITNESSES AN EXECUTION
Private Moses A. Parker, a young volunteer in the Third Vermont Infantry, 
frequently wrote home, taking time to debate the merits of his generals, describe the 
“splendid country” of Virginia as his unit marched through it, and ask that friends and 
family “pray for [him]” while he fought the Confederates.1 His letters also recorded the 
horrors of warfare. During an early engagement in May 1862, when the intensity of the 
combat was still relatively new to the untested soldiers, Parker noted how a “well 
directed shell.. .burst directly behind me killing the one.. .behind me and my left hand 
man in rank wounding the other at my right.”2 Though each man surrounding him had 
been killed or mangled by the cannonball, he reported the devastation as easily as he 
wrote about receiving stamps and letterhead from home. The experience of Civil War 
combat had taught this recruit to quickly accept the violence inherent to the battlefield.
Three years later, in January 1865, Moses Parker reenlisted with the Second 
United States Sharpshooters after having suffered a grievous wound earlier in the war.
He continued to write letters home with stories of everyday labor and drills. However, in
1 Moses A. Parker to Eliza Hale, 26 May 1862, A War o f  the People: Vermont Civil War Letters, Jeffrey 
Marshall, ed. (Hanover, NH: University Press o f New England, 1999), 80-81. As a general rule, I have 
attempted to retain the particular idiosyncrasies o f each writer, editing the material only when absolutely 
necessary for clarity.
2 Parker to Hale, 19 September 1861, Marshall, ed., 45.
3 For a detailed analysis o f how Civil War soldiers reacted to and endured the experience o f combat, see 
Earl J. Hess, The Union Soldier in Battle: Enduring the Ordeal o f  Combat (Lawrence: University Press o f  
Kansas, 1997). For an alternative interpretation suggesting that soldiers ultimately could not master 
conflict, see Gerald Linderman, Embattled Courage: The Experience o f  Combat in the American Civil War 
(New York: Free Press, 1987).
2
3one particular correspondence, Private Parker was clearly affected by the death of a 
single soldier in his camp. As he noted in the letter home, nothing prepared him for the 
incident, “even to the long tried soldier who has stood unmoved under the shower of 
leaden hail.. .such scenes are bad enough but are not compared to the one we witnessed to 
day; the shooting of a comrade for desertion.”4 Private Parker, an experienced soldier 
who typically wrote unemotional accounts of friends who were killed or wounded, was 
overwhelmed by the execution of a single, anonymous soldier.
Compared to the hundreds of thousands of soldiers who were brutally killed on 
the battlefield, the few hundred who were executed by the Union and Confederate armies 
seem insignificant; in fact, they are often relegated to little more than a footnote in most 
accounts of casualties. Specifically, while the Northern armies suffered 360,222 soldier 
deaths over four years of war, only 267 men were executed by authorities across that 
same period.5 Thus, while 14% of Federal troops died in service to their country, only a 
small fraction (0.011%) of those who entered the war suffered capital punishment.6 The 
majority o f these executions took place in the later stages of the war, with over 84% in
4 Parker to Hale, 5 January 1865, Marshall, ed., 285-6.
5 Everett Long, The Civil War Day by Day: An Almanac, 1861-1865 (Garden City, N Y : Doubleday & 
Company, Inc., 1971), 710. Long drew upon the three major accounts o f Civil War casualties available. 
These include Frederick Dyer’s A Compendium o f  the War o f  the Rebellion (1908), Thomas Livermore’s 
Numbers and Losses in the Civil War (1901), and William Fox’s Regimental Losses in the American Civil 
War, 1861-1865 (1889).
6 Robert Alotta, Civil War Justice: Union Army Executions under Lincoln (Shippensburg, PA: White Mane 
Publishing Company, Inc., 1989), ix. His work remains the only full-length treatment o f Civil War death 
penalty issues, and it provides information on every known and recorded sentence. Alotta’s work, though 
extremely useful for details, reflects the author’s intention to report the “delivery -  or miscarriage -  o f  
justice.” See Alotta, Civil War Justice, xi. Thus, his analysis largely ends with hints o f conspiracy between 
the military and the government, and examines very little o f the cultural aspect o f  capital punishment in the 
army. Alotta has also produced a book-length case study o f the circumstances surrounding the execution of 
Private William Howe. Like his other work, this monograph focuses on the actual court trials and 
documents rather than on the perceptions o f the execution. See Robert Alotta, Stop the Evil: A Civil War 
History o f  Desertion and Murder (San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1978). In contrast, this paper will center 
on the growth o f the military’s system of control over soldiers (particularly through executions) and how 
Northerners’ responses to capital punishment indicate a widespread rejection of the practice.
4the last two years of the bloody conflict.7 According to the dictates of military law, all 
soldiers—regular infantry, volunteers, or conscripts—could face the death penalty for a 
variety of offenses. The records show that men died on the gallows or in front of the 
firing squad for the crimes of murder, mutiny, rape, and other transgressions punishable 
in civil life. However, the most frequent act for which soldiers received the sentence of 
death was solely a military offense: desertion. While the accounts are fragmentary, at
o
least 147 Northern men faced execution for desertion from 1861 to 1866. The 
importance of executed victims lies not in their numerical obscurity but in the impact 
they had on the American public.
The executions of Union soldiers sentenced for desertion and the records of these 
acts in letters and newspapers provide a unique window into American culture during the 
Civil War era. The American public grew increasingly literate in the mid-nineteenth 
century, and soldiers, civilians, and officials frequently penned letters or diary entries 
about their daily lives. Specifically, the stories of the few hundred men executed by the 
Civil War armies figured prominently in accounts written by soldiers, their families, and 
newspaper correspondents. This is especially true for the Union armies, for which many
7 Alotta, Civil War Justice, 202-209. According to Alotta, the total executions in each year where desertion 
was at least one cause for death sentence: 1861 - 2, 1862 - 2,1863 - 60, 1864 - 65, 1865 - 39. These 
numbers do not add up to 147, since that is just the number of confirmed executions in the official records; 
other possible deaths have only circumstantial evidence. What is clear, however, is that executions 
increased as the desertion rate rose, though certain months witnessed large concentrations o f deaths (for 
instance, 24 men in December 1864 alone). See Alotta, Civil War Justice, 44, 202-209. In fact, the process 
o f “justice” quickened as well— on average it took 487 days between the incident and the sentence o f death 
for 1861 desertions, but only 23 days in 1865. As the war progressed, the military necessity for execution 
appeared greater, hurrying many sentences along. See Alotta, Civil War Justice, 18.
8 Long, 714. Despite the cessation o f armed conflict in 1865, army authorities continued to execute men- 
at-arms for crimes committed during the war for a year. These numbers were found in an unpublished 
military document entitled “U.S. Soldiers Executed by U.S. Military Authorities During the Late War 
1861-1866” cited by Long. Although no similar reports exist for the Confederacy, historians suspect a 
similar number o f Southern men were executed.
5more official documents and personal letters have survived.9 A sampling of Union 
soldiers’ letters and diaries suggests that most soldiers witnessed at least one execution 
during their time in the service, and many described the event in significant and often 
gory detail. In particular, the punishment ceremony with its rigid displays of military 
authority awed the soldiers who stood at attention, causing them to reflect upon the 
circumstances attending the execution. Ultimately, the practice of and response to 
military executions provide insight into America’s complex understanding of the limits of 
state authority and the subtle but important ways people’s opinions modified the 
boundaries of government and military power.
During the Civil War, the power of the military and the state grew exponentially, 
spurred by the demands of the massive Federal armies and their efforts to quell the 
Confederate rebellion. In particular, the government began to exert unprecedented 
control over individual Americans, especially soldiers. Volunteer farmhands and clerks 
eagerly signed up to fight the Southerners only to be hastily thrown into the rigors of 
military discipline. The federal draft, initiated in March 1863, sent officers to scour the 
countryside and round up men and boys previously unwilling to fight in Virginia and 
Tennessee. The Northern government asserted extensive control over these individuals, a 
control some came to reject. Over the course of the war, tens of thousands of Union 
soldiers fled the army and returned to their communities. Within months, the early trickle 
of deserters grew to a massive tide, and though desertion rates fluctuated somewhat with 
the fortunes of war and political events, the government and military recognized the need
9 The United States government retained many more records than the Confederacy, due in part to the 
destruction o f Richmond near the end of the war. More extant Union letters are on record as well, if  only 
because the North had so many more soldiers than the South.
6for harsher and more stringent domination of soldiers.10 Once recaptured, most of the 
deserters were returned to their units as their bodies were too useful for stopping 
Confederate bullets. Some, selected either for their recalcitrance or simply for being the 
last ones caught during a wave of desertions, faced a court martial and potential 
execution at the hands of United States authorities. Capital punishment of deserters 
demonstrated the totality of the Federal government’s control over the individual and the 
ultimate depths of state power.
Although some deserters were executed quite early in the war, the complex 
interplay between state power and military justice steadily evolved over the course of the 
conflict. Executions had taken place in armies for centuries, including American armies. 
The early punishments for deserters reflected more established military traditions and 
customs.11 However, over the course of the war, the numbers of deserters increased 
dramatically, and the military used executions not just punitively but also as extravagant 
displays of its complete power over soldiers. At the same time, the federal government 
faced increasingly vocal opposition to the war and implicit challenges to its authority, 
particularly through desertion. A radically new system of disciplining and observing 
soldiers and civilians became the solution for both of these issues. As the Civil War 
unfolded, the military and civilian government worked hand in hand to root out disloyalty 
and reassert total control over the individual. Nothing demonstrated this state power like 
the execution of Union soldiers.
10 In her classic study o f Civil War desertion, Ella Lonn notes that over the years for which the Provost 
Marshal had complete data, the rate o f desertion continuously increased overall. See Ella Lonn, Desertion 
During the Civil War (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1966), 151. First published 1928 by American 
Historical Association.
11 These older punishments included imprisonment, hard labor, and execution. However, the executions 
earlier in the war were much less ostentatious affairs than later. See Chapter II.
CHAPTER I
STATE POWER AND THE EXPANSION OF MILITARY JUSTICE
A vigorous debate over the proper limits of state authority had raged since well 
before the American Civil War. In fact, during the crises surrounding Shays’ Rebellion
in 1786-1787, some of the very figures who had recently fought the British monarchy
12turned around and argued over their own government’s power. Nothing less than the 
very existence of republicanism was at stake in these discussions of the state’s authority 
over capital punishment. Sam Adams firmly believed that the fledgling American 
government could and should exercise the power of execution; his opinion concerning 
several Shaysites condemned to the gallows was simple: ‘“The man who dares to rebel 
against the laws of a republic ought to suffer death.’”13 Benjamin Rush strongly 
disagreed with his Boston compatriot. In fact, according to historian Louis Masur, “the 
very act designed to preserve the Republic, Rush argued, violated republican principles 
and would in time contribute to its extinction.”14 In the end, the Shaysites were hanged 
before a large audience, but the deaths of these prisoners did nothing to answer the 
fundamental question: Did a republican government, even in wartime, have the right and 
just power to execute its own citizens?
12 Shays’ Rebellion, named after leader Daniel Shays, was an uprising in western Massachusetts amongst 
indebted farmers, many o f whom were veterans o f the American Revolutionary War. These regulators shut 
down debtors’ courts and engaged in fights with militia before largely dispersing by the summer o f 1787.
13 Louis Masur, Rites o f  Execution: Capital Punishment and the Transformation o f  American Culture, 
1776-1865 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 30.
14 Ibid.
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Some seventy-five years after Daniel Shays laid aside his gun, the United States 
was in the midst of a crisis far more extreme and widespread than the farmers’ rebellion. 
The American Civil War of 1861-1865 required mobilization and innovation on a 
massive scale. The national governments of both the Union and the Confederacy 
established new requirements in their federal relationship with the states by levying 
volunteer soldiers. As the death toll mounted, first the Confederacy and soon thereafter 
the Union enacted a draft, requiring able-bodied men to enlist in the army and fight for 
their country. Many on both sides of the war were exempted from this act, often by 
hiring a substitute or by proving that they were required at home.15 Among the thousands 
who wished no part o f the conflict but could not afford to refuse service, including some 
in uniform who set off for home, many were collected, imprisoned, and sometimes 
executed. These strong acts of state authority, both in the North and the South, were 
radical enlargements of the traditional role of government in America.16 Such changes 
inevitably aroused controversy amongst the populace; while the bloody conflict raged on 
the fields of Virginia and Tennessee, soldiers and citizens alike waged an intellectual 
battle to define the proper role of the government and the military in their lives.
The power of government (“the state”) and the power of the military authorized 
by that government (“the military”) are intimately connected, particularly in the case of a
15 Some draftees were exempted because they were the sole provider for their family. Rich draftees 
typically hired a substitute (in the North, often a poor immigrant) to fill their shoes. Interestingly, these 
substitutes numbered high among deserters. The so-called “Commutation Clause” that allowed for men to 
hire replacements with a $300 fee to the government was repealed by Congress in 1864. See “Deceiving 
the People,” Valley Spirit, July 6, 1864, http://valley.vcdh.virginia.edu/ and “Foreign and Colonial 
Intelligence: America,” The Illustrated London News, July 16, 1864, http://cti.library.emory.edu/
16 Although he focuses more frequently on questions removed from the battlefront, Harold Hyman covers 
much o f the same constitutional ground in A More Perfect Union. Americans vigorously debated the 
proper limits o f their government’s power; obviously, many Southerners and Northerners felt that the 
causes o f the war lay in different interpretations o f the federal government’s role. As the war dragged on, 
legislators and civilians alike contemplated and reshaped these issues. See Harold Hyman, A More Perfect 
Union: The Impact o f  the Civil War and Reconstruction on the Constitution (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1973).
9civil war. The American Civil War was an internal war, fought between groups with 
common backgrounds, traditions, and histories. Therefore, while armies were not the 
exclusive distinction between the factions in this civil war, the military of each antagonist
1 Hmust in large part have represented the difference between the two sides. In essence, 
the army, one of the few tangible entities not previously shared by the opponents, helps to 
define the state it serves. This works in reverse as well; in a republican system, the 
government must exert some control over its military. During the Civil War, the Provost 
Marshal organization, ostensibly an arm of the military, was used by both the national
1 o
and state governments for non-martial tasks. One periodical in 1863 records how 
“Provost Marshals were appointed in some of the States, upon the nomination of their 
Governors, to act under direction of the State Executive.”19 Thus, the state and the 
military, far from being distinct loci of power, are directly tied to one another, deriving 
their authority and legitimacy together.
Michel Foucault makes this connection between the state and the military explicit, 
particularly in the context of an execution. Although referring specifically to a 
seventeenth- or eighteenth-century European example, Foucault’s analysis is equally 
applicable to nineteenth-century America. The condemned were marched to the gallows, 
which were ringed with military escorts and guards. The procession was led by civil
17 For the Union during the war, the army did not only represent the loyal states, but increasingly became a 
politicized object linked with the Republican administration. Theoretically this was far less likely in the 
South, where the absence o f distinctive political parties and the presence o f a Northern army solidified the 
populace’s connection between the army and the Confederate government. In the North, on the other hand, 
a large portion o f the Democratic Party began to identify itself by opposition to the war, which 
consequently tied the army to the Republicans. For instance, soldiers in the famous Iron Brigade endorsed 
a resolution supporting the Federal Militia Law, advocated for by Republicans and detested by many 
Democrats. Interestingly, many officers in the Federal army identified themselves as Democrats, as did 
many soldiers. See Coralou Peel Lassen, ed., Dear Sarah: Letters Home from a Soldier o f  the Iron Brigade 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 82.
18 For this paper, “Provost Marshal” will refer to the organization as a whole or the military department, 
while “provost marshal” will refer to individual units.
19 “Suspension o f Civil Law in War,” Advocate o f  Peace, January/February, 1863, www.proquest.com/
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20administrators, court officials, and judges, as well as archers, cavalry, and foot soldiers.
The powers of military and state government were intentionally interwoven as two parts
of a system of control over the prisoners. Foucault summarizes the situation succinctly:
Now, this meticulous ceremonial was not only legal, but 
quite explicitly military. The justice of the king was shown 
to be armed justice. The sword that punished the guilty 
was also the sword that destroyed enemies.21
In the display of power necessitated by an execution of prisoners, the connection between
the military and the state is made explicit. Government and the army forged an even
closer association to justify the deaths of volunteer soldiers fighting to preserve the
Union.
Despite this connection, nineteenth-century Americans, firmly committed to the 
virtues of republicanism, did not blindly accept the growing power of the state, 
particularly in wartime. Of all the developments in government power and coercion that 
arose during the Civil War, few sparked more controversy amongst the public than 
military justice. As the Union government and military leaders began to realize that the 
war would not be won overnight, they enforced more rigorous and exacting discipline 
within the ranks of the army. Military tribunals and policing actions expanded and 
penetrated the home front and traditional civilian institutions. Although many citizens 
accepted these measures as necessary in a time of war, others firmly disagreed with the 
expanded power of the state. The Advocate o f Peace, a wartime journal, took note of the 
dangers implicit in military justice in a brief editorial about the Provost Marshal. Justice 
in a time of war is difficult to achieve, for war is “a temporary despotism, the one-man
20 A more thorough examination of Foucault’s theory, as well as analysis o f the spectacle o f execution and 
the power o f the state over the body, will follow in Chapter II.
21 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth o f  the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1995), 50.
11
power wielding the sword with little or no direct responsibility to man or to God.” The 
editors claimed to trust their government “in their assumption of what are called war- 
powers,” but they also believe that “necessity is said to know no law; [as] the men who
• • 9 9claim this wide and fearful license, need to be watched with sleepless vigilance.” This 
statement shows that reverberations of the Revolutionary-era fear of government, 
particularly regarding executions, were still felt in the nineteenth century.
In the first months after Fort Sumter, the New York Journal o f Commerce printed 
an editorial vehemently opposing the war. Although this Democratic-leaning paper likely 
disagreed with the conflict for several reasons, the author of the piece chose to emphasize 
the possible fearful consequences of the fusion of military and government power. The 
author suggests that the war, even if successfully prosecuted, “must be over the ruins of
99the Republic.” The very nature of American society was being threatened because of 
the encroachment of military justice into civil affairs. The editorial warns of manifold 
dangers:
[T]he suspension of the writ of Habeas Corpus; the seizure 
and confiscation of private property by military force; 
citizens taken by soldiery, and put under martial arrest for 
trial, for speaking treason; the provost marshal superseding 
the sheriff; and the drum head taking the place of the jury 
box; these and many other acts of like character, done by 
the President or under his authority, are wholly without 
warrant in law.24
The author of this editorial explicitly decried the ways in which formerly civilian tasks, 
especially in law enforcement, were now being undertaken by the military. Military
22 “Suspension o f Civil Law in War,” www.proquest.com/
23 “Some Reasons I Am Opposed to the Present War,” New York Journal o f  Commerce, May 11, 1861; 
reprinted in The Liberator, July 12, 1861, www.proquest.com/
24 Ibid. Emphasis in original.
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justice, previously confined to the ranks during campaigns, out of sight of the public at 
large, was now felt acutely by the citizenry.25
O f all the new or expanded organizations involved in dispensing military 
justice—including justice in the form of executions—the office of the Provost Marshal 
proved to be the most controversial. Small provost marshal units had been a fixture 
within the United States army for decades.26 In fact, policing within the ranks was 
deemed so essential that the Revised Regulations for the Army o f  the United States listed 
military discipline as its first topic.27 However, the massive size of the armies fielded 
during the Civil War coupled with the fact that the majority of soldiers were civilian 
volunteers or conscripts rather than professionals necessitated a significant expansion of 
the military police. More specifically, after the debacle at First Bull Run, when 
thousands of Union soldiers fled all the way to Washington, the new head of the Army of 
the Potomac formalized the organization. In February 1862, George McClellan ordered 
the creation of the Provost Marshal’s Department, an office meant to coordinate military
9o
discipline and justice. Just over a year later, in March 1863, the Provost Marshal’s 
Department assumed control over all military policing, a duty heretofore performed by
?Qprovost marshal units designated by the particular armies and units. As the Provost
25 O f course, the massive increase in the size o f the armies and the fact that the battlefields were within the 
states themselves and not in a foreign territory brought the military much closer to civilian life as well.
26 The early provost marshal units were responsible for affairs within their regiment, brigade, etc., but 
maintained a provincial outlook. It was only during the Civil War that these units were organized into a 
more centralized structure.
27 Revised Regulations fo r  the Army o f  the United States, 1861. (1862; repr., Harrisburg, PA: National 
Historical Society, 1980). Hereafter cited as Revised Regulations.
28 Kenneth Radley, Rebel Watchdog: The Confederate States Army Provost Guard (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1989), 2. No corresponding study currently exists on the Provost Marshal 
of the Union army, though Radley compares and contrasts the respective organizations frequently. 
Moreover, he admits that the “onerous roles and tasks” o f the Confederate Provost Marshal were the same 
as those for the Union army because “many Confederate regulations and orders, including the Articles o f  
War, were almost exact copies o f Union regulations.” See Radley, 2.
29 Ibid.
13
Marshal organization became more centralized, its influence over the army—and 
citizenry—greatly expanded.
Within the army itself, the Provost Marshal’s presence was felt daily. In 
establishing the Provost Marshal’s Department, General McClellan judged that the 
traditional operations of a democratic army were insufficient for the scale of the Civil 
War. In other words, the units of the armies could no longer be trusted to punish offenses 
internally; instead, a supervisory organization was needed to ensure discipline. One of 
the major duties of the provost marshal units in the army was observation; in some cases, 
units were ordered to guard the enemy’s prisoners, but their main objective was to 
monitor their own comrades. As Foucault notes, “The exercise of discipline presupposes 
a mechanism that coerces by means of observation.” Soldiers in the Federal armies 
were under surveillance at all times and were well aware o f it, just as the Provost Marshal 
and top generals intended. Spying on the soldiers’ everyday actions was not sufficient to 
control such a large body of troops; rather, by forcing the men to acknowledge the 
constant presence of the Provost Marshal, the theory went, the soldiers would discipline 
themselves.
The very arrangement of the Federal regimental camps demonstrates Foucault’s 
theory in practice. As Figure 1 shows, the police guard units were placed directly in the 
middle of the location for observing all of the troops.31 This situation provided the 
provost marshal units with the most effective police units to set up camp with “the tents
30 Foucault, 170.
31 As mentioned earlier, the police guard units were initially designated by the corps or divisions, but these 
duties were later undertaken by soldiers under the command of the Provost Marshal -  a further effort at 
centralizing the disciplinary arm of the military.
FIGURE 1
CAMP OF A REGIMENT OF INFANTRY
Plate X
C am p o f  a  R e g im e n t o f  In fa n try .
O i.— C tlsm sL
Jt.t. Clj— Xdtut. Cbiomeit.
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The provost marshal units are represented by the two ‘x’ marks in the center o f camp. 
Image reproduced from Revised Regulations fo r the Army o f  the United States, 1861. 
(1861; repr., Harrisburg, PA: National Historical Society, 1980), 77.
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facing to the front,” or in the direction of the rows of privates.32 Even when resting in 
their tents, the ordinary soldiers, many volunteers unaccustomed to military discipline, 
were meant to see the provost marshal units that were observing them. The Revised 
Regulations orders police soldiers, scattered around the perimeter o f the campsite, to 
“warn [the Colonel], day or night, of any unusual movement in or about the camp,” and
'X  'Xto “arrest, at any time, suspicious persons prowling about the camp.” For the officials 
concerned with military discipline it was important to witness and report possible 
dissension within the regiment. Tellingly, in the Revised Regulations, the Provost 
Marshal’s order to spy within the camp precedes any mention of how to guard enemy 
prisoners of war.
The sweep of the Provost Marshal’s surveillance was not only limited to the army
in the field. In fact, one official proposal would have had members of the Provost
Marshal observe every new recruit in order to catalogue the men visually:
It has been suggested that on every man’s descriptive list at 
enlistment there be entered such marks as he may have 
about him, to facilitate his identification in case he should 
desert. Such marks as many men have tattooed on their 
forearms and hands, birthmarks, scars, &c., might be noted 
under “remarks” on every enlistment paper.34
In this idea, the Provost Marshal proposed a radical transformation. The distinctive
characteristics of each body helped to individualize a person physically. However, the
Provost Marshal hoped to use the very uniqueness of a person’s body to better police him
within the anonymity and collectivity of the army. This concern about desertions is
32 Revised Regulations, 76.
33 Ibid., 85.
34 The War o f  the Rebellion: A Compilation o f  the Official Records o f  the Union and Confederate Armies, 
127 vols., Series III, Volume V, Part 1, pg. 757. Hereafter cited as OR.
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particularly interesting in the midst of a war where men died of wounds so gruesome that 
their corpses could be identified only by a tattoo.
As the war grew in scale, the Provost Marshal began to watch over many other 
aspects of the soldiering life, including hospitals for wounded and sick soldiers. This 
extension of military discipline, and thus state power, into realms previously overseen by 
physicians is mirrored by Foucault’s analysis of discipline. He notes how the hospital in 
early modem Europe became intertwined into a mechanism of discipline by the increased 
use of the medical examination. Doctors became more specifically involved in 
inspecting their patients over time. This helped to turn the hospital, which had previously 
been little more than a poorhouse, into an institution devoted to linking medical 
knowledge with power over the patient.
During the American Civil War, the Provost Marshal’s office made use of the 
army’s medical corps and further exerted its own authority over it by requiring physicians 
to report potential deserters in their hospitals. During Grant’s Overland Campaign, 
General Henry Halleck sent the commander over a hundred men who “[had] arrived [in 
Washington] with the wounded, under pretense of wounds, which on examination [was] 
found to be false.”36 The prescriptive for this handful of men proved to be but a prelude 
to an expanding system of observation. Later in 1864, C. H. Crane, the acting Surgeon 
General of the United States, informed all medical staff officers of new regulations 
affecting their posts. Crane ordered that “the Surgeon in charge, as soon as a desertion is 
ascertained, will report the fact d irect... to the Provost Marshal of the D istrict... and to
35 Foucault, 187.
36 OR, Ser. I, Vol. XXXVI, Pt. 2, pg. 652-653.
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37such other Provost Marshals as might be of immediate aid in making the arrest.” The 
apparatus of military observation and discipline was thus instituted, at least later in the 
war, within hospitals themselves. Doctors were employed as spies on their own soldiers
T O
as the Provost Marshal made use of their inspections to ferret out deserters. The 
Surgeon General then noted that “this is in addition to the regular reports of deserters sent 
to the Provost Marshal General’s Bureau.” With the new order, the military police were 
merely tightening their control over the hospitals.
Not only were doctors ordered to watch out for potential deserters, but their very 
profession was subsumed as another layer of discipline over the Northern soldiers. After 
the close of major hostilities in 1865, the Provost Marshal sent a questionnaire to all 
Federal army surgeons still in uniform. In this letter, the military police first requested 
doctors to “state in minute detail [their] method of examining men.”40 The Provost 
Marshal then ordered the doctors to share information with them that simultaneously 
incorporated the physicians as an arm of military discipline and lessened their 
independence and power. The surgeons were required to divulge “the frauds most to be 
guarded against, which are practiced by drafted and enrolled men to escape, and by 
substitutes and recruits to enter the service.”41 By providing this information, the medical 
officers gave the military police access to some of their specialized knowledge of
37 “Army and Navy News,” M edical and Surgical Reporter, June 25, 1864, www.proquest.com/
38 The author is not aware o f how many deserters were uncovered by medical professionals or how many 
surgeons actively participated with the Provost Marshal’s office. However, the very existence o f standing 
orders to co-opt physical examinations into a system o f discipline suggests a great deal about the increasing 
power o f the Provost Marshal within the army.
39 “Army and Navy News,” June 25, 1864, www.proquest.com/
40 “Statistics o f the Provost-Marshal-General’s Office,” Medical and Surgical Reporter, July 1, 1865, 
www.proquest.com/
41 Ibid.
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ailments and body composition—their medical expertise that distinguished their role in 
the army.
The Provost Marshal recognized that draftees were being released too easily and 
decided to use its domination of the surgeons to advantage.42 Leaving the front for 
medical reasons was one avenue towards desertion and the Provost Marshal wanted to 
limit any such opportunities. Thus, in November 1863, Provost-Marshal-General James 
B. Fry drafted a circular with a list of forty-one maladies and disabilities that would be 
acceptable excuses from military service; surgeons and inspecting doctors were ordered 
to report how many men fit into each category.43 Moreover, as the Herald o f  Health 
reported in 1864, the Provost Marshal commanded the medical corps sufficiently to 
renege on the very guidelines issued by Fry the previous year. A new circular 
countermanded the previous notice to doctors by ruling that “incipient consumption 
[would] not exempt a drafted man from service.”44 The state had successfully 
maneuvered into a position where it had the ultimate vote on specialized health matters, 
going against the wishes of much of the medical community.45 Without the exclusive 
access to such information, the army surgeons became simply another set of eyes for the 
Provost Marshal to continuously monitor the Federal soldiers.
Within the expanded apparatus of military and state discipline, the provost 
marshal units did not merely serve as internal spies. As alluded to earlier by the editors
42 Such activities were particularly true after conscripts became aware o f the various maladies that would 
help them to avoid the draft. Scientific American reported in September 1863 how “fully three-fourths o f  
the applicants for exemption” receive it on account o f either “hemorrhoids [or] rupture.” See “Curiosities 
o f the Draft,” Scientific American, September 5, 1863, www.proquest.com/
43 “Army and Navy News,” Medical and Surgical Reporter, November 21, 1863, www.proquest.com/
44 “Soldiers’ Department,” Herald o f  Health, June 1864, www.proquest.com/
45 The Herald o f  Health, speaking for a large number o f physicians, deplored the new regulations issued by 
the Provost-Marshal-General’s Office. They considered the rule “a grave mistake on the part o f the 
constituted authorities.” See “Soldiers’ Department,” www.proquest.com/
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of the Journal o f  Commerce, military discipline began to erode the lines between civilian 
and military authority. The Provost Marshal department steadily concentrated more 
operations under its mandate, simultaneously removing any civilian influence from such 
processes. In December 1861, provost marshals were ordered to round up citizens near 
the frontlines in Missouri and relocate them further away from the battlefields.46 Just 
nine months later, General Wadsworth sent a Provost Marshal Department unit to close 
down the Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, Patriot and Union and arrest its publishers on 
trumped up charges.47 The Provost Marshal even went so far as to take over 
responsibility for disputes “between employers and employed” within Union-controlled 
Louisiana.48 Military police were in charge of fixing wages for freedmen in order to 
ensure a functioning plantation system and called upon immediately to investigate “if 
complaint was made.”49 Within a year, the Provost Marshal in Louisiana had 
transformed from a military watchdog into a civilian bureaucracy, thereby transferring 
whole plantations under the army’s control. As all of these examples show, the military’s 
disciplinary machine, with the acquiescence of the federal government, had completely 
transformed civilian relations across the nation.
46 Such herding took place in St. Louis in response to threatened advances by Confederates. Whilst moving 
these civilians, provost marshals were still being ordered to carefully observe the citizens and quarter 
“Union refugees ... upon avowed secessionists.” See “News Items,” Saturday Evening Post, December 14, 
1861, www.proquest.com/
47 The Patriot and Union was accused o f printing a false recruitment poster urging “the colored people o f 
[Harrisburg] to assemble for the purpose o f being mustered into the military service o f the United States.” 
While such a publication would have interfered with military matters, the newspaper was charged with 
trying to start a racial riot and discredit the government entirely. See “Harrisburg Newspaper Men 
Arrested Saturday Evening Post, August 16, 1862, www.proquest.com/
48 “A Valuable Publication,” The Liberator, July 29, 1864, www.proquest.com/. “Employers” and 
“employed” are euphemisms for former slaveowners and African-American freedmen. On a side note, 
many o f the Provost Marshal soldiers involved in Louisiana related more easily with the former white 
masters and helped these men to institute a form of strict serfdom in newly emancipated areas.
49 “Letter from Hon. John Hutchins,” The Liberator, March 17, 1865, www.proquest.com/
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The most important and far-reaching assignment of the provost marshals during 
the war straddled the worlds of civilians and soldiers: the arrest and punishment of 
deserters. As Joan Cashin has noted, desertion was not only widespread amongst the 
Federal armies but also oftentimes supported by loved ones on the home front.
Recounting the stories of thousands of Northern deserters, Cashin records how 
“repeatedly their comrades said that deserters had gone home, and there, surrounded by 
relatives, friends, acquaintances, and neighbors, many of them lived for months or even 
years without being arrested.”50 Some recruits and draftees never bothered to report for 
duty in the first place, and their numbers and power in the community often challenged 
the Provost Marshal. As early as 1862, an editorialist in Vanity Fair quipped that the 
military police would “have a fine time of it hunting up General Greeley’s 900,000 men, 
not one of whom has ever yet answered to his name at roll-call!”51 Clearly, desertion and 
resistance to military service were significant problems; in fact, dealing with desertion 
became the primary task of the provost marshals scattered around the country. It was in 
this duty that the absolute power of the state showed most forcefully.
After the war, Provost-Marshal-General James B. Fry recounted the beginnings of 
the “Deserters Branch” of the Provost Marshal’s bureau. Shortly after the start of the 
war, the relatively low number of desertions were handled according to established 
precedents: A “$30 reward was offered for the apprehension and delivery of a deserter to
52an officer o f the Army at the most convenient post of [sic] recruiting station.” The
50 Joan Cashin, “Deserters, Civilians, and Draft Resistance in the North,” in The War Was You and Me: 
Civilians in the American Civil War, ed. Joan Cashin (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 271.
51 “Work for the Provost-Marshals,” Vanity Fair, November 29, 1862, www.proquest.com/. “General” 
Greeley refers to Horace Greeley, publisher of the New York Tribune and abolitionist who nevertheless 
opposed many of Lincoln’s war policies.
52 OR, Ser. Ill, Vol. V, Pt. 1, pg. 750.
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horrors of war, homesickness, and necessity soon struck the ranks, however, and the 
previous strategies for dealing with deserters proved incapable of stemming the tide away 
from the battlefields. In August 1862, the army issued General Order 92, which 
authorized civilians such as “the mayor and chief of police of any town or city” or even 
any postmaster to act as special provost marshals to sweep up more deserters. While 
these persons still received the bounty paid out for a successful capture and served only 
as deputies, only one month later, in September 1862, the Provost Marshal and the 
powerful army behind it crossed another threshold. With General Order 140, a corps of 
provost marshals was created whose express duty “was to arrest, spies, [sic] etc.”54
In addition to these explicit orders to spy on American citizens, the officers of the 
Provost Marshal were permitted to use “citizens, constables, sheriffs, or police officers” 
from the local citizenry to help them track down deserters.55 Civilian law enforcement 
was being melded into an able assistant of the military. And yet, as General Fry reported, 
these efforts were still unsatisfactory. The Provost Marshal’s department was thoroughly 
reorganized and expanded, and in early 1863 documents were forwarded to local provost 
marshals with a “descriptive list [including the deserters’] place of residence, and such 
available information as might lead to their arrest.”56 The calculated planning, efficient 
organization, and wide sweep of this expanded Provost Marshal’s bureau finally 
succeeded in rounding up significant numbers of deserters.
In the face of such cold efficiency, local officials and civilians started to establish 
limits on how much power they would allow to the federal military and its police. For
53 OR, Ser. Ill, Vol. V, Pt. 1, pg. 751.
54 t u : a
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example, in the words of General Fry, early in 1863 “considerable trouble was 
experienced” by the provost marshals when state courts began to issue writs of habeus 
corpus and take deserters away from the military police. In many cases these deserters,
cn
the general lamented, “often escaped punishment.” Soldiers themselves acted to 
undermine the authority of the provost marshals as well, often by spreading stories about 
the punishments deserters would endure if returned to duty; in friendly local environs, 
these tales often helped soldiers gain the sympathy of neighbors who would protect them 
from the military police. General Fry simply could not understand the fear these 
punishments stirred in soldiers and civilians alike; as he put it, “Being tied up by the 
thumbs, though not a severe punishment, sounds to those who suppose it means ‘hung up 
by the tugs’ like a most barbarous proceeding.”58 As more and more deserters returned 
home and recounted the dangers that awaited them, some civilians proved reluctant to 
side with the army and state, resenting such treatment as an abuse of power.59
General Fry, who quickly dismissed such corporal punishments as mild, was 
wholly in favor of the most severe: the death penalty. Looking back over the course of 
the war, Fry firmly denounced the actions taken by the government as ineffective and 
negligent:
The large bounties given to volunteers have undoubtedly 
been an inducement to many to desert for the purpose of re- 
enlisting; but a still greater inducement has been the 
leniency with which the most culpable deserters, have been
57 OR, Ser. Ill, Vol. V, Pt. 1, pg. 752.
58 Ibid., 755.
59 Lonn suggests that civilian reluctance to aid the Union army in capturing deserters grew as the desertion 
rate rose, as evidenced by the government’s response to the problem. At the start o f the war, civilians who 
aided deserters or “enticed a soldier from his duty was subject to a fine o f $300 or imprisonment for one 
year.” These threats apparently did not halt the practice, for in March 1863, Congress passed a new law 
increasing the potential fine to $500 and lengthening the possible prison sentence. The Congressional 
actions suggest that civilians were being influenced by deserters to defy the army and government. See 
Lonn, 166
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treated. Had the extreme penalty attached to desertion been 
invariably carried into execution bounty-jumping and 
desertion would not have reached such gigantic 
proportions. The time elapsing, too, between arrest and trial 
give the reckless and often skillful deserter opportunity to 
escape. In the case of desperate and well-known offenders, 
a speedy trial and short shrift would have exerted a salutary 
influence.60
Fry understood the power o f capital punishment well; he recognized the coercive power 
of the government over its citizens and how the ceremony of state-sponsored death could 
force discipline. As Foucault theorized, an execution “deploys before all eyes an 
invincible force,” a force soon in the hands of the Provost Marshal when this department 
came to oversee all punishments of deserters61 As noted, this power over life and death 
proved to be the military police’s most effective and severe tool in enforcing discipline, 
yet it also became the most controversial. The spectacle of the execution sparked a 
reaction in many Americans that other encroachments on rights and liberties failed to 
elicit. In order to completely understand this rejection of state power, however, it is first 
necessary to survey the intent of the death penalty and comprehend the message such 
suffering was supposed to deliver to the Northern public and its armies of volunteers.
60 OR, Ser. Ill, Vol. V, Pt. 1, pg. 755.
61 Foucault, 48.
CHAPTER II 
THE SPECTACLE OF THE EXECUTION
Private Wilbur Fisk of the Second Vermont Volunteer Regiment experienced war 
like thousands of other Union soldiers. He joined the ranks in late 1861, following the 
Northern debacle at Bull Run. He was a young man from a small community who 
hurried to the call of duty to put down the rebellion. Perhaps more educated and 
idealistic than some, Fisk was extremely eloquent in his prose. This gift steered Fisk 
towards a joint career; while on campaign, he regularly wrote to his hometown paper as a
ftOsoldier-correspondent. In folksy but informative accounts, Fisk provided his hometown 
with eye-witness journalism and candor. One of his most detailed letters described an 
execution of two deserters from his division in late December 1863. As Fisk prefaced the 
story, he “never was obliged to witness a sight like that before, and [he] sincerely hope[d] 
a long time may intervene before [he was] thus called upon again.”
Fisk had no illusions about what he was made to witness. The fresh graves of the 
deserters lay a short distance outside of camp, and the units were marched into formation 
around them. Fisk understood that “these men were made examples, and executed in the 
presence of the Division, to deter others from the same crime.”64 The soldiers o f the unit
62 Emil and Ruth Rosenblatt, eds., Hard Marching Every Day: The Civil War Letters o f  Private Wilbur 
Fisk, 1861-1865 (Lawrence: University Press o f Kansas, 1992), 179. Fisk took on the pen-name o f “Anti- 
Rebel” for his letters. He himself was later branded a deserter while traveling home to be married. It 
seems that his case was erased from the books because o f his status as a soldier-correspondent with the 
newspaper. See Rosenblatt, eds., vii-ix.
63 Ibid, 179.
64
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were drawn up in a hollow square, with the empty end containing only the two graves. 
Into this theater, “two ambulances drove on to the ground with two live men, and two 
coffins to contain them, and these were to fill the newly made graves.”65 The rites of the 
execution ceremony did not end there, for “after the sentence [of death] was read, the 
chaplains stepped forward by [the prisoners’] side, ... the prisoners kneeling as they 
prayed.”66 The deserters returned to this subservient kneeling position on top of their 
coffins as the execution squad was readied. Immediately after the fatal shot was 
delivered to each prisoner, the division “marched in columns around the spot where the
f \ 7 __bodies of the two men were lying just as they fell.” The bodies were placed in their 
caskets, lowered into the earth, and the remaining soldiers then resumed their duties.
Private Fisk’s detailed account of this Union military execution describes a sight 
witnessed by nearly every soldier in the Federal service. But this death was vastly 
different from the thousands who perished right next to friends on the battlefield or in the 
noxious tents of prison hospitals. This was the death of a Union soldier at the hand of the 
Union army, a carefully orchestrated and symbolic execution carried out in order to prove 
a point. Each step in the process, each image recounted by Fisk, was not an accident, but 
a conscious act in a drama of power. Capital punishment is, simply put, state-sanctioned 
murder, and a legal murder requires both a justification and a goal for legitimacy. The 
ceremony surrounding the death penalty fulfilled both of these necessities.
Fully understanding the importance of these military executions requires thinking 
about them as presentations of power, not just attempts at discouraging desertion. Few 
theorists have captured the essence of capital punishment like Michel Foucault,
65 Rosenblatt, eds., 180.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
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particularly in his work Discipline and Punish. Foucault’s most significant contribution 
to historical study is his emphasis on reading the human body as the physical 
manifestation of power relations. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault chronicles the rise 
o f the prison system in Europe as a replacement for archaic demonstrations of public 
torture and death. He argues that the story of this transformation must be situated in 
human bodies and the changing conception of how best to control human bodies. In 
Foucault’s theory, methods of punishment were adapted to fit the government’s desire for
/o _
greater command over the bodies of its citizens. Thus, detailed knowledge of bodies 
was an instrument of power for the state and the military, a power that was wielded in 
order to extract usefulness from the bodies of citizens. In fact, as Foucault mentions,
“The body becomes a useful force only if it is both a productive body and a subjected 
body.”69 Even the most efficient workers or soldiers were no use if  their bodies were not 
rigidly disciplined and under the complete control of the state or military.
As a method of enforcing such control, the United States Army developed the 
military police system, intelligence units, and military prisons. However, it was the state- 
sanctioned death of deserters that best proved the power of the government over soldiers; 
after all, the deserter had personally inverted the system of subjection by leaving his post 
and his government’s army behind.70 His impending death was the final reminder to him 
of the awesome power of the state over his body. But, as previously mentioned, only 147 
Union soldiers were killed by the Federal army for desertion; the personal deterrence was 
minimal. Far more important was the effect that capital punishment of deserters had on
68 This conception meshes neatly with the creation o f the Provost Marshal’s Office in the Federal army 
during the American Civil War, as the state believed that old methods o f self-policing within the ranks 
were not sufficient to maintain the rigid control necessary to win the war.
69 Foucault, 26.
70 See Foucault, 27.
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the thousands of soldiers standing at attention just yards away and the millions of citizens 
on the home front who read of the death squads in the newspapers and letters home.
The intended effect of military executions was written on the very body of the 
condemned soldier. According to Foucault, much like the monarch’s body has a dual 
nature in that it is both the corporeal form of the king as well as the office of the king, so 
too does the body of the executed soldier have a dual nature. For the unfortunate 
prisoner, his body is both his physical self and a “code [for] the ‘lack of power’ with
71which those subjected to punishment are marked.” The body of the deserter, slumped 
on his coffin and riddled with bullets, is a physical manifestation of the control the 
Federal army had over each body in Union blue. The dead deserter was punished not to 
eliminate one particularly unruly body but to create a symbolic second body representing 
the power of the state writ large.
The United States government and army officials recognized the impact 
executions had upon soldiers and created procedures to emphasize the ceremony of death 
penalties. According to Foucault, one of the primary features o f a successful execution is 
publicity. As he notes, Europeans understood that “men will remember public 
exhibition” and that “from the point of view of the law that imposes it, public torture and
72execution must be spectacular, it must be seen by all almost as its triumph.” Military 
guidebooks emphasized the same point: The very goal of an execution requires as large 
an audience as possible. The standard manual used by officers in the field during the
71 Foucault, 29. Foucault goes on to suggest that the power of the state exercised upon the powerless 
prisoner, the “inverted figure o f the king,” creates a similar duplication o f the body as was experienced in 
the body o f the king. In this case, however, the product is the soul. For Foucault the soul is not mythical 
but the result o f power exercised for control on the punished body. The implications o f these ideas, though 
potentially useful for understanding the development o f military prisons, are beyond the scope o f the 
present study. See Foucault, 29.
72 Ibid., 34.
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Civil War was Captain Stephen Benet’s Treatise on Military Law and the Practice o f  
Courts Martial. Benet, drawing upon a long military tradition, made clear that “as one 
great end of punishment is the prevention of crime by example, it should be rendered, in 
this respect, as extensively useful as possible, by the publicity which attends its
'j'y
execution.” The government’s priority in executions was to impress its absolute 
authority upon the men in ranks. To achieve the greatest effect, military death sentences 
were “carried [out] in the presence of so much of the command of the accused.. .as 
[could] be ‘conveniently assembled for that purpose.’”74 The army hoped that many 
soldiers would witness the sanctioned death of a comrade to strengthen their appreciation 
of the military’s control.
Government officials acknowledged the importance of these acts and encouraged 
their practice as well. As Gideon Welles, Lincoln’s perceptive Secretary of the Navy, 
recalled, the Cabinet assembled in February 1863 to discuss “the question of making an 
example by shooting a deserter” and “the necessity of an example to check a rapidly
n r
increasing evil was assented to.” Moreover, the government was largely concerned 
with the execution as an example to the assembled troops rather than as a punishment to 
the individual deserter; in fact, Welles noted that the incident “did not strike [him] as so 
aggravated a case as some others.”76 But Welles and other authorities would have 
appreciated a maxim expressed by Foucault: “The public execution is to be understood
73 Stephen Vincent Benet, A Treatise on Military Law and the Practice o f  Courts Martial (New York: D. 
Van Nostrand, 1862), 166.
74 George Davis, A Treatise on Military Law o f  the United States (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1906), 
166. Although compiled well after the Civil War, the procedures o f the military had changed very little.
75 Edgar Welles, ed., Diary o f  Gideon Welles, Secretary o f  the Navy under Lincoln and Johnson, 3 vols., 
(New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1911), 232.
76 Ibid.
29
not only as a judicial but also as a political ritual.”77 In other words, the President had an 
interest in supporting military executions because deserters were the physical 
representation of a rejection of his political authority to command the bodies of citizen 
soldiers.
The generals in the field also appreciated the effect executions had upon 
questionably loyal soldiers. The attending officers’ attention to detail reflected this 
appreciation of the impact of the event. An Indianapolis newspaperman was singularly 
impressed with how Col. A. A. Stevens had “‘arranged everything most admirably’ for
■70
the public execution of three deserters by members of his command.” Brigadier 
General William Lytle practically boasted to his sister about the arrangements he had 
made:
I send you an account of Calhouns [sic] execution which 
appeared in the Journal today. Everything went off 
smoothly to my great satisfaction -  We only got the order 
the night before & it took me nearly all night to make the 
arrangements. Some of the regiments had to move six or 8
7Qmiles, but everything was sharp on time.
Both of these officers understood the necessity of displaying the military’s perfection and 
they made every effort to present an effective display of state power.
Other commanders were far more blunt in stating the role of executions. George 
B. McClellan, soon to head the famed Army of the Potomac, reported to his wife in 
August 1861 that certain soldiers “will be tried & probably shot tomorrow -  an example 
is necessary to bring these people up to the mark, & if they will not fight & do their duty
77 Foucault, 47.
78 Paul Cimbala, “ Soldiering on the Home Front: The Veteran Reserve Corps and the Northern People,” in 
Union Soldiers and the Northern Homefront: Wartime Experiences, Postwar Adjustments, eds. Paul 
Cimbala and Randall Miller (New York: Fordham University Press, 2002), 196.
79 William Lytle to Josephine Lytle Foster, 7 February 1862, For Honor, Glory, and Union: The Mexican 
and Civil War Letters o f  Brig. Gen. William Haines Lytle, ed. Ruth Carter (Lexington: University Press o f  
Kentucky, 1999), 99.
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from honorable motives, I intend to coerce them.”80 McClellan’s use of “coerce” shows 
how central the authority of the government and the military were to the executions of 
Civil War soldiers. Far more than other aspects of regimented army life, the totality of 
the death penalty proved the power of the state over the individual.81
Soldiers and civilians usually understood the message being broadcast by the state 
in ceremonies of capital punishment. Volunteers and conscripts filled their letters to 
loved ones at home with passages describing every detail of the macabre pageantry they 
witnessed. As with all other events in military life, the death of a deserter was a 
formalized routine. Soldiers generally began their descriptions by reflecting upon the 
mood of the moment, most echoing the sentiments of Surgeon Spencer Welch that the 
event “was a very solemn scene.”82 Newspaper correspondents were also struck by the
83“scene of unusual grandeur” which was filled with an “awful impressiveness.” As 
proscribed by the manuals, the sentences were carried out in the presence of as many men 
as possible. John Pardington wrote his wife that before any prisoners arrived, “our 
Bragade [sic] was drawn up in a solid square.”84 Pardington must have been mistaken 
about the arrangement of the men, as one end of the field was always left open in case of
80 George McClellan to Mary Ellen McClellan, 14 August 1861, The Civil War Papers o f  George B. 
McClellan: Selected Correspondence, 1860-1865, ed. Stephen Sears (New York: Da Capo Press, 1992), 85. 
Interestingly, the soldiers referred to by McClellan were not shot as he predicted.
81 The interesting case o f a private in the Nineteenth Indiana captures the importance generals placed on the 
ceremony o f the execution. After the condemned was “led forward blindfolded” to the stake, the officer in 
command set the firing squad at the ready, but before yelling “Fire!” he paused when “a horseman rode 
rapidly up the road, waving in the air a paper, which was understood by all to be a reprieve.” As the 
witness recorded, “His death had really never been intended; but it was deemed necessary for the good 
order and discipline o f the army to make an impression upon not only himself, but the whole brigade.” See 
“A Remarkable Incident,” New York Times, January 13, 1862, www.proquest.com/
82 Margaret Wagner, Gary Gallagher, and Paul Finkelman, eds., The Library o f  Congress Civil War Desk 
Reference (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 479.
83 “From City Point -  Imposing Military Execution,” New York Times, February 1, 1865, 
www.proquest. com/
84 John Pardington to Sarah Pardington, 21 February 1863, Lassen, ed., 77.
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stray shots from the firing squad. Still, the imposing geometry of row after row of 
soldiers must have only heightened the impact of the moment.
In fact, by indicating that an entire brigade was organized, Pardington may have 
actually underestimated the scale of the affair. Other witnesses, such as John Hartwell, 
recalled that the punishment was carried out “in the presence of our Divishen,” a group 
likely to number over ten thousand men.85 One soldier thought it unlikely that his wife 
would be able to comprehend the sight he had witnessed, so he felt compelled to draw a 
sketch of the layout that day, carefully noting the placement of the prisoners,
86commanding generals, and the particular regiments brought out to view the execution. 
While the number of soldiers brought to the event added to the visual power of the 
military, the actual identity of the spectators was also very important. As the 
Indianapolis Daily Journal reported late in 1864, though one particular execution was not 
a public affair, “among those allowed to witness the ‘terrible lesson’ were about a 
hundred bounty jumpers.”87 As these descriptions show, the military executions of the 
Civil War were structured to impress as many people as possible with the power of the
oo
state’s authority.
85 Ann Britton and Thomas Reed, eds., To my Beloved Wife and Boy at Home: The Letters and Diaries o f  
Orderly Sergeant John F.L. Hartwell (London: Associated University Press, 1997), 136.
86 James Wright to Fanny Wright, 1 February 1864, The Civil War in North Carolina: Soldiers’ and 
Civilians’ Letters and Diaries, 1861-1865, 2 vols., ed. Christopher Watford (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & 
Co., 2003).
87 Cimbala, 196.
88 For a complex study o f how Americans understood death, see Gary Laderman, The Sacred Remains: 
American Attitudes toward Death, 1799-1883 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996). Laderman 
argues that nineteenth century Americans associated details rituals and ceremonies with all deaths, 
including executions. Thus, the symbolism inherent to military punishment would be readily recognizable 
by soldiers o f the time. See also David Blight, Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory 
(Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press o f Harvard University Press, 2001). Though focusing on race 
relations following the war, Blight’s study offers additional analysis o f how nineteenth-century Americans 
remembered the violent deaths o f the conflict. See also Figure 2.
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FIGURE 2
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC -  EXECUTION OF THREE DESERTERS
An exemplary portrayal of the most extreme punishment enacted in the name of military 
discipline during the American Civil War. This representation clearly shows the 
pageantry and ceremony that were a part of every execution. Image reproduced from 
Harper’s Weekly, August 8, 1863, pg. 509. Accessed through HarpWeek, 
http:// app.harpweek.com/
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A large number of witnesses was not the only element of the execution that
reinforced the government’s authority. Foucault theorized about the fundamental
necessity of making every aspect of capital punishment an extreme action:
Its aim is not so much to re-establish a balance as to bring 
into play, at its extreme point, the dissymetry between the 
subject who has dared to violate the law and the all- 
powerful sovereign who displays his strength. Although 
redress o f the private injury occasioned by the offence must 
be proportionate, although the sentence must be equitable, 
the punishment is carried out in such a way as to give a
O Q
spectacle not of measure, but of imbalance and excess.
The death of the deserter must include symbols and rituals that completely glorify the 
power of the state while simultaneously demeaning the prisoner as utterly powerless. To 
do anything less would reduce the impact of the death upon the witnesses present and 
squander an opportunity to display invincible authority. Thus, executioners designed 
their spectacles with sensory clues to reinforce their message. Oftentimes, these clues 
were embodied in the prisoner himself and the rituals he was forced to enact as part of his 
own demise. The military police’s job, then, was to “[seize] upon the body of the 
condemned man and [display] it marked, beaten, broken.”90 The deserter’s living body 
before and during the ceremony and his corpse immediately following the gunshots 
literally displayed the awful force of the military over the individual.
The descriptions of executions in newspapers and soldiers’ letters home often 
mention these visual clues and the impression they made on the witness, just as the army 
intended. Though few civilians saw firsthand men being put to death during the war 
years, many read about the ceremonies and would take note of the penalties for 
disobeying the army’s control. Typical of the newspaper descriptions, the New York
89 Foucault, 48-49.
90 Ibid., 49.
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Times' story of the death of deserter Joseph Lane emphasized the drama and pageantry of
the situation, intended to certify the state’s power:
A solemn assembly was seen approaching, headed by [the 
Provost Marshal]. Following him was the band, with 
muffled drums, playing the “Dead March in Saul,” and then 
the (firing) detachment to whom was assigned the still 
more unpleasant duty of launching a fellow-being into 
eternity.9
Soldiers and journalists joined in a somber moment of reflection when they told of the 
entrance of the prisoner into the setting. Sergeant John Hartwell felt that “it was a 
sorrowfull sight to see [the condemned] ride seated on his Coffin around the Square his 
eyes streaming with scalding tears.”92 Newspapermen brought similar sights home to 
readers, reflecting in morbid detail how “the criminals were sitting upon their respective 
coffins, with the yawning graves in the rear.” Those present at military executions 
often focused on the unfortunate victim, placing the readers of their letters or articles 
practically face-to-face with the prisoners so that those at home would be certain to 
understand the government’s control over each citizen.
The extent to which Civil War executions reflect a Foucault-style state is 
especially clear in one death during the first year of the conflict. In December 1861, the 
Union army executed the first soldier for desertion since the Mexican War.94 Private
91 “Department o f the South -  Execution o f Joseph Lane, alias John Kendall, alias Thomas, for Desertion, 
on Morris Island, SC,” New York Times, December 27, 1863, www.proquest.com/
92 Britton and Reed, eds., 136.
93 “Execution o f the Five Substitute Deserters,” New York Times, August 31, 1863, www.proquest.com/. 
Those who organized the event were clearly aware o f the impression o f power it was meant to impart, as 
noted by the journalist witness: “More than ordinary interest was exhibited in this execution o f military 
law, and it is estimated that not less than 25,000 persons were present. The ground was well selected, and 
every arrangement so complete that no accident occurred to mar the solemnity o f the proceedings. ... 
Previous to the execution the scene presented a remarkable view to the spectator.” See “Execution o f the 
Five Substitute Deserters,” www.proquest.com/
94 Several volunteer soldiers who had deserted General Winfield Scott’s army on its drive to Mexico City 
were captured after the American army stormed the Mexican redoubt of Molino del Rey near Churubusco. 
Many o f  these soldiers who, unlike most Union deserters in the Civil War, had actually taken up arms for
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William Johnston, a member of the First New York Cavalry, was shot by a tiring squad 
for leaving his picket post around Washington, D.C., and the arrangement of his 
execution soon became the norm.95 In stark contrast to the terse comments on most 
executions later in the war, the account of Private Johnston’s crime and subsequent 
punishment is extremely detailed. As Harper’s Weekly reported, Johnston confessed 
before his death that he “had not the slightest intention of deserting up to a few minutes 
before [he] started in the direction of the enemy’s lines.”96 According to his confession, 
Johnston, like many soldiers, simply hoped to see his family and then return to the army. 
Johnston was soon confronted by some members of the Third New Jersey who arrested
Q Thim and returned him to camp to face a trial.
Harper’s Weekly continues with an elaborate description of the spectacle of 
Private Johnston’s death. Several elements of his punishment ritual reflect special efforts 
by the military to emphasize its authority over soldiers and complete command of the 
individual. The entire division was assembled precisely on the field to form three sides 
of a square, reserving the open end for Johnston and the executioners. Johnston was then
the opposing cause were hung high on a hill overlooking the city during the final battles. Most American 
soldiers agreed with Sergeant Tomas Barclay that “these Wretches richly merited death,” and Ralph 
Kirkham, who noted that “[he] presume[d] they [would] all be hung, for shooting is too good for them.”
See Allan Peskin, ed., Volunteers: The Mexican War Journals o f  Private Richard Coulter and Sergeant 
Tomas Barclay, Company E, 2nd Pennsylvania Infantry (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1991), 158; 
and Robert Miller, ed., The Mexican War Journal and Letters o f Ralph W. Kirkham (College Station: Texas 
A&M University Press, 1991), 52.
95 Alotta, Civil War Justice, 48-49. Some accounts o f this private’s death name him as Johnson; I chose to 
follow Alotta’s spelling, given his extensive research into the specific executions in the Union army.
96 “The Execution o f Johnson,” H arper’s Weekly, December 28, 1861, http://app.harpweek.com/.
According to Johnston, his mother lived in New Orleans and he hoped to find a way to her through the 
Confederacy. The accuracy o f this statement could not be verified, though the press gave no indication that 
Johnston was anything less than a sincerely homesick soldier.
97 Ibid. Unlike many other deserters early in the war, Johnston was hurried through the court martial 
process. According to Alotta, Assistant Adjutant General J. Williams sent Brigadier General William 
Franklin a letter explaining the method o f military executions and a formal list o f charges against Johnston 
on December 7, 1861. As Johnston was dead within the week, it seems clear that his case was quick and 
efficient. As more deserters were caught, however, the process o f court martial soon became more drawn 
out. See Alotta, Civil War Justice, 48-49.
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brought to the site, accompanied by dozens of other soldiers. As the newspaper described 
it, “The Provost Marshal, mounted and wearing a crimson scarf across his breast, led the 
mournful cortege.”98 He was followed by four buglers, twelve soldiers forming the firing 
squad, the coffin on a wagon, Johnston, two priests, and the whole of Company C,
Lincoln Cavalry, as an escort.99 The extensive processional was meant to signify the 
power of the sovereign, specifically represented in the person of the scarf-bearing provost 
marshal. Since President Lincoln and the top military brass could not be present at each 
execution, the provost marshal served as their delegated representative, symbolically 
bearing the color of blood upon his uniform.100 In direct contrast to the decorated 
authority figure was the coffin for the deserter Johnston, “of pine wood stained, and 
without any inscription.”101 Johnston could not be placed in an ornate or even a named 
coffin, as he was soon to be a non-entity. The individual who had been Private William 
Johnston would be executed, leaving only a body that was no longer his own. His corpse
98 “The Execution of Johnson,” http://app.harpweek.com/
99 H arper’s Weekly notes that the firing squad was composed o f twelve men, one from each company o f the 
regiment, “selected by ballot.” Their weapons, Sharps breechloaders, “had been previously loaded under 
the direction o f the Marshal. One was loaded with a blank cartridge, according to the usual custom, so that 
neither o f the men could positively state that the shot from his rifle killed the unfortunate man.” See “The 
Execution o f Johnson,” http://app.harpweek.com/. Modem scholars have noted these issues as well, 
recognizing that i f  a soldier knowingly fired the fatal shot, “the thought o f it might always be painful to 
him.” See Wagner, Gallagher, and Finkelman, eds., 479. This custom brings up very important issues. 
According to Pieter Spierenburg, people around the world, especially Europeans, regarded executioners as 
practitioners o f an infamous profession. In fact, “the hangman’s touch was considered as a penalty in 
itself;” in other words, these men were vilified by society simply because o f their task. See Pieter 
Spierenburg, The Spectacle o f  Suffering: Executions and the Evolution o f  Repression (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1984), 19. This commonly held view explains, in part, why the soldiers were 
randomly selected. The squad members’ own moral views were also taken into account by giving one man 
a blank charge. However, this only partially removed the stigma o f being part of the execution. Moreover, 
were the executioners, though simply pulled from the ranks, now seen as part of the state punishment 
apparatus by their comrades? Civil War executions are difficult to pinpoint on this topic, since the shooters 
were both normal soldiers and appropriated bodies used by the state for an extra, highly onerous, task. The 
record is largely mute on soldiers’ feelings toward the firing squads, except for occasional gratefulness at 
not being amongst their number.
100 See Foucault, 53.
101 “The Execution o f Johnson,” http://app.harpweek.com/
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would instead become a physical manifestation of the military’s ability to control soldiers
and keep them in the ranks.
Johnston was brought into the square and placed next to his anonymous coffin;
the firing squad was arranged six paces in front of him. After being read the final
sentence of the court martial, the condemned was given a few moments to speak to the
assembled soldiers:
‘BOYS, - I ask forgiveness from Almighty God and from 
my fellow-men for what I have done. I did not know what 
I was doing. May God forgive me, and may the Almighty
1 0 9keep all of you from such sin! ’
Johnston was then given a final few minutes with the Catholic priests to prepare him for
the moment at hand. His confession and penitence are both classic elements o f a public
execution, according to Foucault. A statement of guilt such as Johnston’s lament “added
1
to the conviction the signature of the convicted man.” By proclaiming his guilt, the
prisoner made the public aware of what had transpired in the private chambers of the 
court martial. By invoking God in his confession and in taking time to kneel with the 
priests, Johnston is hoping that He will be mindful of the suffering in the execution and 
subtract it from any penance still to be exacted in the hereafter. In explicitly allowing for 
religious elements, the military implicitly linked their ceremony with Christian 
sanctimony and the approval of God.104
Now prepared for his death, Johnston was blindfolded and, at the sign of the 
provost marshal, shot by the firing squad. As the article relates, the unfortunate man was
102 “The Execution o f Johnson,” http://app.harpweek.com7
103 Foucault, 44.
104 See Foucault, 46.
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not killed in the initial volley, though he had been hit several times in the heart.105 
Therefore, a reserve of shooters was immediately brought forward to dispatch Private 
Johnston; these four men fired at point blank range into the prisoner’s head.106 Whereas 
the provost marshal was able to simply assemble a firing squad from the ranks, the task 
of completing a botched execution like Johnston’s fell squarely upon the shoulders of the 
military police. The reserves were usually members of provost marshal units or, 
sometimes, just the presiding provost marshal with his pistol. The military was certain to 
ensure that discipline ultimately lay in the hands of its designated authorities, even if that 
required a pistol blast to the head. As a final act in the drama, every member of the 
division was marched around to see the “bloody corpse of his late comrade, who had 
proved a traitor to his country.”107 Whether consciously or not, this concluding sentence
of the article in Harper’s Weekly reflects how Johnston was no longer a specific
108individual, but simply a “corpse” that was symbolic of any “traitor.”
The visual description of Private Johnston’s death ceremony is full of the 
symbolism of state authority. This aura of control was also presented to Americans in the 
wartime images that filled the pages of popular periodicals and newspapers. Sketch 
artists like Alfred Waud and Edwin Forbes traveled with the Federal armies to capture
105 “The Execution o f Johnson,” http://app.harpweek.com/. As an explanation for Johnston’s survival o f  
the first volley, the article noted that “two o f the firing party, Germans, had not discharged their pieces.” 
Although they served as the physical representatives o f the state authority in this ceremony of death, these 
reluctant executioners were nevertheless subject to discipline - for their hesitation “they were immediately 
put in irons.”
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid. The entire execution took precisely forty-five minutes, from processional to death; the length o f  
the ceremony was no doubt another conscious effort to drive home the message being relayed through the 
execution.
108 As the first Union soldier executed for desertion in the Civil War, Private Johnston’s death earned 
significant press coverage. For a foreign perspective on the event, see “[Among the Illustrations o f the civil 
war in America],” The Illustrated London News, January 11, 1862, http://cti.library.emory.edu/
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scenes of battle, camp life, and even military discipline.109 A few prints survive of 
military executions, including that of Private Johnston. In conjunction with the written 
record, these pictures fully reveal the contrasting visual cues of power and powerlessness 
in capital punishment.
The images of Private Johnston’s execution reveal other conscious symbols of 
military power. In Figure 3, Johnston is depicted in civilian clothes at the ceremony, his 
cavalry uniform having been tossed to the side, as shown below. This small gesture is 
very important for the state apparatus—the state must not allow Johnston to die in 
uniform for that would associate the coward with other loyal soldiers. On the contrary, 
the prisoner was clothed plainly but uniquely from his peers, so that his “dress 
demonstrated the power of the state...to expose outwardly those judged inwardly evil.”110 
Johnston’s clothes designated him as one who had broken the system of military 
discipline and thus had lost his right to the honor of the uniform.111 Johnston’s pose is 
also critical; rather than standing at attention to face his fate, he is shown in the pose of a 
supplicant. Johnston’s crouching pose suggests a religious act, the begging of 
forgiveness. As mentioned before, a confession and request for prayer was a typical part 
of the ceremony. More importantly, however, Johnston is crouched upon his plain coffin 
as if too weak to face the inevitable. Truly, this was likely the case, and the records show
109 O f course, the American Civil War is more famous as the first major conflict to be documented in 
photographs. However, the photographic technology of the time was incapable o f capturing moving scenes 
-  thus, all battle photographs were taken several days after the fact. Therefore, the images o f military 
executions were documented almost exclusively in drawings. The one exception known to the author is a 
photograph of a black Union soldier coincidentally named Private William Johnson, included as an 
appendix to this paper.
110 Masur, 47.
111 Despite this visual dishonor, Johnston and other soldiers convicted solely o f desertion were killed by a 
firing squad rather than by hanging. Hanging was seen as the punishment o f criminals; desertion was only 
a rejection o f the state’s authority to exert discipline over a body. All Americans assumed that deserters 
would at least be spared the complete loss o f respect associated with hanging. Unfortunately, many 
soldiers whose only real crime was desertion were hung regardless for trumped up charges, particularly 
African-American soldiers.
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FIGURE 3
THE EXECUTION OF THE DESERTER WILLIAM JOHNSON IN  GENERAL 
FRANKLIN’S DIVISION, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC
Private Johnston is drawn in excellent detail and with definite personality in this image, 
more so than in any of the later depictions of executions. Image reproduced from 
Harper’s Weekly, December 28, 1861, pg. 828. Accessed through HarpWeek, 
http://app.harpweek.com/
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FIGURE 4
TWO PRE-CIVIL WAR IMAGES OF EXECUTIONS
EX <:CUTiQN OF MILLS,
Cf' M' — |
Miittfc hh lFSjt m d Bve Gatsfo* •
The image on the left, Lewis M iller’s sketch o f the hanging o f John Lechler at Lancaster, 
Pennsylvania in 1822, though the later of the two, shows the colonial-era imagery of the 
execution. Such images emphasized the witnesses in an attempt to show the 
community’s participation and acceptance of such punishments. The image on the right, 
Illustration from the Narrative of the Pious Death of the Penitent Etenry Mills (1817), is 
more typical of reform-era pictures of executions. The highlight is on the condemned as 
a pious and compliant victim and away from the masses, who were in fact kept away 
from the scene more and more frequently. The fact that the dates for these eras overlap 
indicates that these changes developed gradually and were not accepted by all Americans 
Images reproduced from Louis Masur, Rites o f Execution, 104 and 106 respectively.
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most deserters approached their deaths with trepidation. However, the pose also shows a 
terrified man cowering before the undeniable power of the military. Regardless, the 
message being sent home to civilians in these visual clues was obvious: During this war, 
the government and its army held complete control over the bodies of each and every 
soldier.
The visual record for this moment of death is also intimately tied to cultural trends 
in nineteenth-century America. According to historian Louis Masur, as Americans 
moved away from public executions for violent offenders in the 1830s and 1840s, the
119ways that executions were depicted in art and in the media also changed. “Gallows 
iconography” began to shift away from earlier images that emphasized the community’s 
participation in the executions that highlighted the onlookers’ acceptance of the 
punishment and their adherence to societal norms. Instead, as middle-class values of 
privacy began to trump those of community, “depictions of the execution scene [began]
113to focus away from the assembled and towards the condemned.” While this shift in 
perspective arose largely from changing sensibilities, it also eliminated some of the 
references to state control, such as the crowds of approving citizens and the police units 
present in earlier, more community-oriented images, as seen in Figure 4. Additionally, in 
place of the moralizing accounts linked with the eighteenth-century death penalty, new 
penny press newspapers included lengthy descriptions of the ceremonies that were now 
largely held in private.114 The emphasis of these accounts and the new images was on the 
individual being punished and not the structure of the spectacle.
112 A more detailed look at American reform culture is included in Chapter III.
113 Masur, 105.
114 Ibid., 114. As Masur notes, many o f the early penny presses were founded by journalists from working- 
class roots - the very people who largely refused to accept the shift towards private executions. By
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These then-recent transformations in the reporting of capital punishment are 
visible in the prints of Private Johnston’s death. The emphasis in both Figures 3 and 5 is 
on the victim, just as reform-minded middle-class Americans encouraged. The guards 
and soldiers, the visible elements of state authority, are relegated to little more than a 
backdrop. Likewise, the lengthy and very personal accounts of the deserter’s death link 
with the lower-class reader’s desire to know every last detail of the event. However, 
unlike executions in the decades before the conflict, American Civil War capital 
punishment took place in public, like earlier ceremonies of death. As glorifying the 
power of the state over the individual again became the most important aspect of the 
death penalty, the army exhibited its discipline in public and on the very body of the 
deserter.115 This emphasis suggests that the allegorical meaning of the prisoner’s posture 
changed from pre-war to wartime depictions. Before the war, the condemned’s kneeling 
pose was meant to emphasize not only his crime before God but also his ultimate 
forgiveness, just the change reformers hoped the system would cause. The Civil War 
deserters like Johnston were sometimes also hunched over, but now as powerless entities 
under the complete discipline of the state. In Figure 5, an alternate representation of 
Private Johnston’s death, the prisoner is more than bent under the weight of authority; in 
fact, he is completely sprawled across the ground, broken by the army and its provost 
marshals. Johnston’s body, clad here in even more subservient garb than in the previous
publishing detailed stories o f the ceremony, the masses were appeased that justice— which they had once 
bore witness to— had been served.
115 Moreover, the army never “shifted” back to public executions, as military policy had always dictated 
that capital punishment o f soldiers would take place in front o f others. However, unlike in peacetime 
where the army and citizenry were somewhat detached, the interplay o f civilians and soldiers during a war, 
particularly a civil war, means that the portrayals o f these deaths underwent a change. Thus, the 
connection with civilian punishments before the war is both valid and critical to understanding the public’s 
responses to and rejection o f the death penalty for desertion.
44
FIGURE 5
PRIVATE WILLIAM JOHNSON, EXECUTED BY A FIRING SQUAD, DECEMBER 1861
Like Figure 3, in this early war image of an execution the artist followed the prevailing 
cultural imagery and emphasized the victim. Originally printed in Frank Leslie’s 
Illustrated Newspaper, January 4, 1862. Image reproduced from Franny Nudelman, John 
Brown’s Body: Slavery, Violence, & the Culture o f War. (Chapel Hill: The University of 
North Carolina Press, 2004), 144.
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image, is left riddled with bullet holes, rendering the man little more than a metaphor to 
powerlessness.
As the Civil War dragged on past a year and the desertion rate began to soar, the 
images o f military executions changed dramatically. The pre-war relic of emphasizing 
the individual was abandoned completely; instead, the artists tended to sketch scenes that 
reflected a much more intense and organized display of military might. This is 
particularly true of the representation of the deaths of immigrant Privates Walter, 
Rionese, Folancy, Lai, and Kuhn, whose August 1863 execution is shown in Figure 6.116 
General George Meade stated that these men were the first bounty jumpers to come 
before him, so “humanity, the safety of this army, and the most vital interests of the 
country required their prompt execution as an example, the publicity given to which
117might, and, I trust in God, will, deter others from imitating their bad conduct.”
116 The fact that the deserters chosen for this mass execution were all immigrants was likely not a 
coincidence. The reasons are twofold. First, as Masur makes clear, nineteenth-century American 
authorities were far more comfortable with sentencing “outsiders” - foreigners and minorities - to death 
than persons they connected with more intimately. This was also done to appeal to the masses and support 
the government’s authority. As Masur notes, “Those executed were people for whom spectators might feel 
the least sympathy, and, as a result, authorities hoped, the assembled would unite against the condemned to 
defend social stability.” See Masur, 39. Secondly, immigrant deserters were targeted for the death penalty 
because the Provost Marshal believed that they were particularly prone to leave the ranks. An official 
report stated: “It appears beyond dispute that the crime o f desertion is especially characteristic o f troops 
from large cities.” The report explained the importance o f this information: “It is probable that a more 
minute examination o f the statistics ... would reveal the fact that desertion is a crime o f foreign rather that 
native birth. ... In general, the manufacturing States [had a higher desertion rate], and this result is to be 
attributed not only to the fact that such States are dotted with towns and cities, but to the secondary fact that 
these towns and cities [szc] crowded with foreigners.” See OR, Ser. Ill, Vol. V, Pt. 1, pg. 668-669. This 
opinion seems to have been widely shared, both by the Provost Marshal and the soldiers throughout the 
army. It also helps to explain why the government would pass a law in 1865 whereby any deserters who 
did not return to the ranks within sixty days would be deemed to have “relinquished their right o f  
citizenship.” See OR, Ser. Ill, Vol. V, Pt. 1, pg. 677. Immigrants were thus particularly targeted, though 
every deserter could ultimately be structurally removed from participation in the state. Differing opinions 
of executions depending on the origin o f the deserter warrants further study.
117 OR, Ser. I, Vol. XXIX, Pt. 2, pg. 102-103. Bounty jumpers were deserters who left the ranks shortly 
after receiving their enlistment pay (a policy enacted later in the war, as a means o f encouraging volunteers 
rather than draftees). Many such offenders repeated the process over and over. President Lincoln agreed 
with Meade, seeing them as “very flagrant cases.” See OR, Ser. I, Vol. XXIX, Pt. 2, pg. 102.
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FIGURE 6
THE EXECUTION OF FIVE DESERTERS FROM THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
FIFTH CORPS
The identity of the condemned victims is completely lost in this engraving. Their bodies 
are in fact secondary symbols; the most important figures are the thousands of seemingly 
approving men lined up on the hill. Image reproduced from Harper’s Weekly, September 
27, 1863, pg. 616. Accessed through HarpWeek, http://app.harpweek.com/
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Meade’s decision received the publicity he hoped for; a two-page spread depicted 
the death of the five immigrant deserters and was accompanied with an editorialized 
commentary by the artist, Alfred Waud. Waud commended the proceedings for the
“precision” with which “the orders were given and the volley fired.. .there is no doubt
118that [the prisoners’] deathfs] [have] had a very salutary influence on discipline.” The 
massive display that accompanied the execution clearly impressed the artist and, as noted 
by the tone of his comments, was intended to have a similar effect on the readers on the 
home front. Waud’s opinions and the expansive engraving, coupled with Meade’s official 
memo calling for publicity, suggest a very close relationship between the press and the 
officers of the army. The correspondents given the best access to the war were also being 
co-opted as unofficial spokespersons for the apparatus of military discipline. The media 
transmitted the message home to civilians that the army and the state wanted to 
disseminate, particularly in the visual clues they incorporated in the images of executions 
later in the war.
The image in Figure 6 conveys none of the individuality and familiarity of 
Johnston’s death, but rather five anonymous dead men. The victims’ outfits again 
emphasize that the condemned have been removed from the ranks of honorable soldiers. 
The dead are also portrayed as they fell, highlighting their weakness in the face of the 
Provost Marshal’s authority. However, unlike the images of Johnston, the engraving of 
the five immigrants includes the prisoners almost as an afterthought. Far more crucial to 
this drawing are the rows and rows of soldiers standing at attention throughout the 
ceremony. While thousands of soldiers had been lined up for Johnston’s execution as
118 “The Army o f the Potomac -  The Execution o f Deserters,” H arper’s Weekly, September 26, 1863, 
http://app.harpweek.com/
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well, the changing needs of the army and its Provost Marshal dictated a shift in emphasis 
in the way they were represented.
The images engraved in newspaper prints changed because the desertion rate was 
rising; not only were these deserters less unique, but their deaths were seen as far more 
necessary for preserving order. To further this aim, the image focuses on the regiments 
of men behind the condemned. In the most blunt interpretation, the simple sight of 
thousands of soldiers lined up at the army’s command highlighted the undeniable power 
of the army. But the sketch also sent a more refined and subtle message to the civilians at 
home. The anonymous masses of men in rank and file were those who followed army 
discipline. Their presence, coerced as it was, suggested their approval of the sentence.119 
The corpses of the five immigrants were meant to symbolize complete state power over 
the individual. The living bodies of the witnesses were likewise transformed into 
something more than themselves; they became justifications for the capital punishment of 
deserters.120
The images of state-sanctioned murder in the newspapers reflect the profound 
changes that American society underwent during the Civil War. Engravers initially 
modeled their sketches to conform with the prevailing attitudes about executions before 
the conflict, but quickly adapted these pictures to include the symbols and clues about 
military discipline. The execution ceremonies themselves were consciously constructed
119 Foucault offers a similar idea, though rather than stoic soldiers he is speaking o f a jeering mob of  
spectators. Still, the author believes the role of the spectators is fundamentally the same; as Foucault 
writes, “the people had to bring its assistance to the king when the king undertook ‘to be avenged on his 
enemies’, especially when those enemies were to be found among the people.” See Foucault, 59. The 
presence o f the soldiers made the death o f some o f their own, the deserters, all the more legitimate.
120 Interestingly, the last picture related to a desertion execution in H arper’s Weekly portrayed not the 
awesome scene o f the execution, but two detailed portraits o f the victims. This execution took place 
several months after the fighting had ceased, perhaps reflecting the sentiment that the power o f the state no 
longer needed to be reinforced with the public.
49
FIGURE 7
“DEATH TO TRAITORS, ” CIVIL WAR-ERA LETTERHEAD
This image adorned a piece of paper used by soldiers, helping to reinforce the state’s 
message to their family members. Attributed to an artist named E. Cogan. Reproduced 
from Nudelman, John Brown ’s Body, 145.
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to drive home a simple but profound message: The government and its army could 
wholly dominate their citizens. Most significantly, this concept implied the manipulation 
of bodies— civilians being molded into obedient soldiers, and persons on the home front 
accepting the increased regulation of their lives. Those who rejected this system and 
chose to desert were nevertheless affected. Once captured, their bodies could be 
employed by the army to reinforce its message.
The image depicted in Figure 7 was decoration for a piece of wartime stationery. 
In this cartoon, the bodies of the soldiers are contorted so as to literally become, in the
121words of Franny Nudelman, “instruments of violence and emblems of national power.” 
Popular media across the war-torn country, ranging from newspapers to letterhead, 
manipulated images to reinforce federal supremacy.122 The bodies of deserters, bloodied 
and mangled by the firing squad, were even more poignant reminders of the great power 
being wielded by the federal government and the Union army over its citizens. A new 
form of state was arising amidst the turmoil of civil war. As the most vivid and brutal 
evidence of this change, it should not be surprising that the execution of deserters became 
a lightning rod for criticism. Just as the army intended, Americans understood the clues 
being broadcast through capital punishment. Ultimately, however, many chose to reject 
the death penalty for deserters and, by extension, the rapidly expanding authority of the 
state.
121 Nudelman, 145. Nudelman draws heavily from Foucault for a section o f her fascinating book describing 
images o f the war. Her extrapolation o f themes from images o f slaves and soldiers was a significant 
inspiration for the author o f this paper.
122 For other examinations o f how Americans perceived the role o f the state in the war using popular media, 
see Alice Fahs, The Imagined Civil War: Popular Literature o f the North & South, 1861-1865 (Chapel Hill: 
University o f North Carolina Press, 2001). The complicated reactions o f Americans to one particularly 
important execution, that o f the Booth conspirators, is covered in Thomas Turner, Beware the People 
Weeping: Public Opinion and the Assassination o f  Abraham Lincoln (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1982).
CHAPTER III
THE REJECTION OF DISCIPLINE
One of the most eloquent and frank indictments of military justice to come out of 
the Civil War was actually a brief piece of literature. Ambrose Bierce, author and Civil 
War veteran, is perhaps best known for his short story, “An Occurrence At Owl Creek 
Bridge.” This glimpse inside the mind of a spy before his hanging examined the 
complexity of loyalties amidst war and is often viewed by modem readers as a 
commentary on the folly of executions. However, Bierce’s own feelings are much more 
obvious in the allegorical vignette titled “Two Military Executions.” In the story, Private 
Bennett Greene is shot to death because he struck an officer, Lieutenant William Dudley, 
who happened to be a grade school acquaintance of the victim. Dudley begs the 
forgiveness of his friend, but the charges had been filed and the authorities carry out the 
sentence. Several weeks after the execution, the sergeant calls the company roll before a 
battle. Out of habit, the sergeant calls the dead Greene’s name and to everyone’s surprise 
a voice responds. Thinking it a prank, the sergeant repeats the name twice more and 
upon the third time the sound of a shot rings out. Slowly, Lieutenant Dudley, whose 
devotion to the rules was greater than personal friendship, walks to the front of the file
123and unbuttons his vest to reveal a growing crimson stain, then falls dead.
123 Ambrose Bierce, “Two Military Executions,” in Ambrose B ierce’s Civil War, ed. William McCann 
(Avenel, NJ: Wing Books, 1996), 235-238. First published 1956 by Regnery Gateway, Inc.
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Although Bierce leaves the identity of the mysterious new Private Greene
unnamed, the message of the story is clear: The system of punishment within the
Northern army was unjust; moreover, the power of discipline corrupted all who wielded
it.124 Bierce was but one of many soldiers and civilians who questioned the legitimacy of
Civil War executions. Implicit in such a conviction is a rejection of the power of the state
to have full control over the body of the individual. In particular, many Americans began
to believe that death was not a legitimate punishment for the crime of desertion. Foucault
understood this to be a natural consequence of the public execution:
Above all ... the people never felt closer to those who paid 
the penalty than in those rituals intended to show the horror 
of the crime and the invincibility of power; never did the 
people feel more threatened, like them, by a legal violence 
exercised without moderation or restraint.125
For those millions of Americans not drawn up in ranks around the firing squads,
newspaper accounts and soldier letters brought the sensation of state-sponsored death
home. As the Civil War raged on, more Northerners came to reject the capital
punishment of deserters.
This sentiment is not altogether surprising, considering the statistics on desertion 
within the Union army. James Fry, Union Provost-Marshal-General at the end of the 
war, concluded that in the years spanning the fighting, some 201,397 soldiers left the
124 The corruption o f power obviously raises questions about distinctions between officers and enlisted 
men, the army’s class system. According to the records, not one o f the 267 men executed in the Union 
army for any crime were members o f the officer class. Nevertheless, a sizable percentage o f the 
Northerners who deserted to their homes were commissioned officers. The case o f Captains Benjamin 
Berry and Allen Seymour o f the Second New York Cavalry is particularly illustrative o f the different 
treatment received by officers. These two men had “deserted their regiment while on the march of [sic] 
meet the enemy,” clearly a more grievous offence than simply leaving camp. Moreover, the men had 
“continued absent up to the present time,” so General Hooker ordered them “dishonorably dismissed from 
the military service o f the United States.” This passage indicates that no provost marshal units were even 
dispatched to try to hunt down the men, let alone threaten them with physical harm. Clearly, the army 
maintained different standards o f proper discipline and punishment for the higher class o f soldiers than the 
droves o f enlisted men. See OR, Ser. I, Vol. XXV, Pt. 2, pg. 67.
125 Foucault, 63.
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1 O f *army without leave. Many of these men were repeat offenders, some returning to their 
units before running again, meaning that the actual instances of desertions numbered 
much higher. For the last three years of the war, the desertion rate skyrocketed, peaking 
at approximately 7,333 men per month in 1864, the year with the most sustained
i oncombat. Despite the large number of men who left the ranks, only 77,181 soldiers 
were arrested and returned to duty or sent to await punishment in a two-and-a-half-year
i 9 o
span. Of that number, a small percentage, either due to the extremity of their case or
the immediate need for an example to the rest of the army, were tried by courts martial. 
The courts acquitted a number of these men, while others received clemency; however, 
the unfortunate few whom the courts convicted and sentenced to death sparked passionate 
debate within the army and the nation at large.
Older scholarship concerning desertion (and the war) focused almost exclusively 
on the soldiers. In her landmark study, Desertion During the Civil War, Ella Lonn argues 
that soldiers deserted to escape the hardships of war, often because of sympathy with the
129Confederate cause, a lack of adequate supplies, and ineffective discipline. Although 
all o f these issues factored into desertions in the larger sense, more recent scholarship 
contends that historians must look beyond the battlefield for a more complete
126 Lonn, 154. Lonn’s work, despite its age, remains the definitive work on desertion during the American 
Civil War. For a detailed case study o f one state’s experience with desertion, see Bessie Martin, Desertion 
o f  Alabama Troops from the Confederate Army: A Study in Sectionalism (New York: AMS Press, Inc., 
1966). Martin maintains a similar thesis as Lonn with regards to the reasons behind desertion.
127 Long, 714. The desertion rates for 1863 and 1865 were 4,647 and 4,368 men per month, respectively, 
according to T. A. Dodge. These are the only years that the Provost Marshal recorded complete details. 
Lonn suggests that the higher total for 1864 was linked with the Provost Marshal’s history. That year was 
the “apogee” o f the office’s command over other officers, who were probably more thorough in their 
reports o f missing soldiers as a result. See Lonn, 151-152.
128 Long, 714. These figures show the arrest tally from May 1, 1863 to December 31, 1865.
129 Lonn, 127-142. At least one Federal observer supported Lonn’s theory about lax discipline. A citizen 
wrote to the Philadelphia Public Ledger in 1862 complaining that many deserters were simply following 
the manner o f their commanders: “‘While the officers show such dereliction o f duty, the men cannot be 
expected to be much better.’” See Alotta, Stop the Evil, 33.
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perspective. Specifically, new writings examine the significant connections between the
soldiers at war and the civilians at home.130 In regards to desertion, the work of historian
Joan Cashin is particularly revealing. Cashin expands Lonn’s thesis to stress that a
significant proportion of deserters had first opposed the draft, “for many people distrusted
government authority” and felt that the state was overreaching its boundaries. In fact, she
sees the issue as a major philosophical battle “with individual men, their families, and
their communities arrayed on one side and the national government on the other.”131
Thus, not only was desertion linked with the intensification of federal power, but soldiers
and civilians were often speaking with one voice in opposition.
As Cashin makes clear, draft resistance and the work of the provost marshals
were widespread and varied. Some soldiers, including officers, “urged relatives to avoid
military service” while others shared their disagreement with the motives for the war with
1
their family members. Back home, civilians often worked together to aid a soldier who
133chose to reject or had “a difficult time subordinating himself to military authority.”
Many citizens offered refuge on the long path home or provided clothing to replace the 
obvious marks of military service. Others tacitly aided deserters by refusing to
130 This scholarly call-to-arms was publicized in James McPherson and William Cooper, eds., Writing the 
Civil War: The Quest to Understand (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1998). The most 
important study o f the home front is certainly Phillip Paludan, A P eople’s Contest: The Union and Civil 
War, 1861-1865 (New York: Harper & Row, 1988). Other works that have attempted to tie the battlefield 
with the civilians at home include Cimbala and Miller, eds., Union Soldiers and the Northern Homefront: 
Wartime Experiences, Postwar Adjustments and James Marten, Civil War America: Voices from the Home 
Front (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC CLIO, 2003).
131 Cashin, 264. Randall Jimerson, like Cashin and others, delves into the minds o f soldiers in his study o f  
popular thought during the Civil War. He notes that the conflict spawned numerous ideological conflicts 
between soldiers and the government, particularly in regard to individual liberties. While he often focuses 
on how soldiers vilified Copperheads and other opponents o f the war, Jimerson also notes how some came 
to question government figures and business leaders, suggesting that they were prolonging the conflict 
purely for profit. Civilians clearly rejected government authority during the war for many reasons. See 
Randall Jimerson, The Private Civil War: Popular Thought During the Sectional Conflict (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1988).
132 Cashin, 267-8.
133 Ibid., 268.
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acknowledge the existence of their camps. Some Northerners went so far as to violently 
resist the Provost Marshal’s office, which sent officers to find and arrest deserters.
Cashin estimates that thirty-eight employees of the army’s police were killed in 
communities above the Mason-Dixon line.134 Other military authorities were simply 
humiliated, including one officer in Ohio who was captured by deserters and paraded
• 1 T ^around the town in chains. Ultimately, such incidents reveal the degree to which 
civilians and soldiers worked together to undermine the federal authority they came to 
reject.136
Understanding the connections between the home front and soldiers is particularly 
important given nineteenth-century cultural understandings of war. As Reid Mitchell 
suggests in The Vacant Chair, American cultural attitudes tied domestic concerns with 
every other aspect of life, including soldiering. “The centrality of home and the family to 
northern culture,” writes Mitchell, “made them central to the northern soldier’s 
understanding of the Civil War.”137 Soldiers and the citizens at home shared common 
values and beliefs—beliefs that often included a rejection of the government’s attempts to 
coerce its citizens into war. As has been described in Chapter I, one of the army’s basic 
goals was to suppress such values and replace them with loyalty to the cause and 
discipline within the unit. But, as Mitchell notes, “the transformation from civilian to 
soldier was rarely completed.”138 Soldiers preserved their values and beliefs, even when 
they had been incorporated into the military apparatus.
134 Cashin, 274.
135 Ibid., 277.
136 Ibid., 268-279.
137 Reid Mitchell, The Vacant Chair: The Northern Soldier Leaves Home (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1993), xiii.
138 Ibid., 21. Mitchell goes on to suggest that Americans often saw military discipline in terms o f family 
relations, like how parents controlled their children. Thus, many agreed with the necessity o f some degree
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Soldiers’ intimate connection with the home front also helps to explain why many 
came to specifically oppose the execution of deserters. In significant ways, Union 
soldiers were simply reflecting the changing views towards state-sanctioned brutality. 
Although the focus of this analysis is on executions during wartime, it is important to 
note that most victims of capital punishment across nineteenth-century America were 
killed for violent criminal acts like murder or rape. A cursory look at the laws of the 
country would give the mistaken view that the plight of such criminals was not a concern 
to the majority of Americans. At the start of the Civil War, only three states, Michigan, 
Rhode Island, and Wisconsin, had abolished capital punishment, and even within these 
states large percentages of the citizenry clamored to have it reinstated.139 Moreover, only 
two states moved to end the death penalty in the aftermath of the bloody Civil War.140 
With the exception of some radical reformers, most Americans had little problem with 
the killing of guilty murderers, rapists, or traitors, before and after the war.141
The context for capital punishment, however, had changed dramatically over the 
half century preceding the Civil War. In fact, despite the relatively small number of 
Americans who directly opposed capital punishment, changes in society and values led 
many Northerners to question aspects of military executions. Pieter Spierenburg’s study 
of the death penalty in modem Europe, The Spectacle o f  Suffering, offers an international 
comparison. Spierenburg contends that Foucault’s theoretical framework concerning
o f discipline. However, they still believed that the army officers “must recognize that their authority, while 
necessary to military discipline, must operate in accordance to law.” See Mitchell, 54.
139 Masur, 158.
140 Hugo Adam Bedau, ed., The Death Penally in America: An Anthology (Garden City, N Y : Anchor 
Books, 1964), 12. Although Iowa and Maine abolished the penalty during Reconstruction, Maine quickly 
reestablished it seven years later.
141 For more information on the death penalty for civil crimes in nineteenth-century America, see also 
Stuart Banner, The Death Penalty: An American History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
2002).
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prisons and executions is valid, but it ignores how discipline had “interdependencies with 
other societal developments.”142 Thus, Foucault falls short of connecting his theory with 
the changes that were taking place within the population of Europe and amongst the 
governmental structures wielding the power of life and death. Spierenburg suggests that 
the public execution did not give way to the prison system simply to change the mode of 
supervision and discipline of bodies (as Foucault maintains), but rather as a result of 
changing attitudes about punishment and its goals. He asserts that “an original positive 
attitude towards the sufferings of convicts slowly gave way to a rising sensitivity” among 
people that such dramatic pain was unnecessary and immoral.143 Public executions 
thereby faded away as an archaic and barbaric relic of punishment in Europe.
Louis Masur has chronicled the use of the death penalty in post-Revolutionary 
America using a similar model to Spierenburg’s. In the early years of the republic, public 
executions of violent offenders were the norm, and Masur suggests that they were 
structured to drive home the message of communal discipline. Masur writes, “The 
culture of execution day made it clear that everyone within the community was suspect” 
and therefore should be mindful to conform to society’s rules.144 However, in the early 
decades of the nineteenth century, the sensibilities of middle- and upper-class Americans 
began to shift against public executions, and they chose to remain at home and away from 
the gallows.145 Rather than serving as a community event to raise morality, hangings 
were increasingly seen as a brutalizing event.
142 Spierenburg, viii.
143 Ibid., x. Spierenburg attributes this change in attitudes towards suffering to the rise o f  nation states 
throughout Europe in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
144 Masur, 39.
145 Masur draws heavily from Foucault in chronicling the shift in middle and upper class sensibilities. He 
suggests that Americans were increasingly drawn towards “reformative incarceration” rather than death for 
less severe crimes. Echoing Discipline and Punish, Masur writes that the “penitentiary delved into the
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According to Masur, authorities developed a compromise: private executions. 
Proponents of this shift contended that justice would still be served while the scenery of 
death would no longer revolt the public (or give them a chance to rally behind the 
victim).146 But this new situation created different problems. Middle-class Americans 
were now able to exclude the poor from witnessing the death of someone like them, but 
could not easily argue that the penalty was a deterrent when concealed or even that it was 
sufficiently public for a democracy.147 Death penalty opponents used these arguments to 
call for complete abolition, and they were successful in a few localities before the war. 
Most Americans, however, rejected these calls for reform and an end to capital 
punishment. The penalty remained on the books in most states and, if laws are any 
indication, acceptable to the vast number of men who answered the call to arms at the 
start of the Civil War.
While the abolitionist movement did not achieve sweeping changes on the 
surface, it did reflect the shift in attitudes towards public death that occurred in the 
decades preceding the Civil War. Increasingly, sentimentalist Americans saw public 
violence as a negative event, one that harmed those forced to witness it. Significantly, 
however, this rejection of public death did not seem to be widespread amongst those who 
witnessed the executions of soldiers convicted of such civilian crimes as murder or rape. 
The terse summary of the killer William Selkirk’s execution is typical. The New York 
Times report included few details of Selkirk’s demise, noting cynically that the victim
prisoner’s mind or soul, whereas public punishments operated primarily on the criminal’s body.” However, 
Masur also incorporates Spierenburg’s philosophy by noting that reformers also hoped that within the walls 
o f the jail, “a prisoner would internalize values consistent with a bourgeois ideal: sobriety, industry, and 
especially self-restraint.” See Masur, 95.
Ibid., 96-100.
147 Ibid., 108-112.
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asserted his innocence prior “to being swung off.”148 Soldiers themselves seemed to take 
less notice of those killed for murder or rape as well. Sergeant John Hartwell recorded a 
very succinct passage in his diary on July 15, 1864, stating bluntly that “at Poolsville at 1 
P.M. Soldier was hung belonging to the 65th NY for.. .Murder &c.”149 Soldiers seemed to 
have accepted capital punishment for crimes that were also punishable by death in times 
of peace.
The comments about executions differ significantly when the victim was accused 
of desertion. In such cases, many soldiers hearkened back to their values at home and 
argued that the death penalty was a brutalizing experience for everyone involved. In fact, 
the experience was so awful that many came to identify more with the victims than the 
state, thereby completely negating the goal of the execution. Soldiers commonly 
expressed regret for the fate of the victims whose deaths they witnessed in which they 
sometimes took part. Numerous letters to family members or personal diary entries 
documented the emotions men felt as they watched a comrade die. Most expressed some 
level of lament for the poor man, even those whose fate seemed just. In marked contrast 
with his callousness towards a murderer’s death, John Hartwell confided to his diary that 
as the deserter, Joseph Conley, was ushered into the execution square, “the Soldiers pitied 
but could not help.” The sergeant, though noting this melancholy mood, confessed that 
the prisoner “had Diserted 3 times before,” enlisting long enough to receive the bounty 
before he would again desert, “but at last was caught at his tricks and executed.”150 
Other soldiers echoed Sergeant Hartwell’s thoughts. John Hardin Schutt, an 
Indianan with Sherman’s army, wrote home that when he saw a man “escorted through
148 “A Military Execution in Gen. Rosecrans’ Army,” New York Times, June 14, 1863, www.proquest.com/
149 Britton and Reed, eds., 256.
150 Ibid., 136.
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the camps by a band of music with a large placard on his back, on which was the word 
‘Coward’ in large letters” he truly felt for the victim, as the situation “looked hard.”151 
Sullivan Green of the 24th Michigan remembered a similar scene, recalling how the 
condemned’s comrades “gave him a last sad, pitying look” whilst still believing the 
man’s death deserved: “He had cravely deserted them in an hour of danger and had now 
paid the penalty.”152 While these actions do not necessarily equate with an outright 
rejection of the penalty, they did contribute to such a sentiment, particularly when 
reinforced by other examples of excessive state control over the individual.
Private Wilbur Fisk, the soldier-correspondent who had carefully documented the 
spectacle of an execution for his newspaper, was also affected by watching such a 
punishment. Although he understood the reasoning behind the penalty was simply to 
“deter others from the same crime,” Fisk did not fully agree with the method. As he 
declared, “Alas, that it should be necessary! Such terrible scenes can only blunt men’s 
finer sensibilities and burden them the more; and Heaven knows that the influences of a 
soldier’s life are hardening enough already.”153 Fisk believed that the sight of the 
execution abused the sensibilities of the assembled soldiers and added undue emotional 
stress.
Other soldiers who agreed with the punishment in theory were disgusted when 
finally forced to witness it. Samuel Fiske, another combatant-writer, began his 
description of the punishment by admitting that the circumstances warranted the death, 
“such a one as sad necessity has made only two [sic] common in the army of late.” But
151 “Ups, downs o f Civil War shared,” South Bend Tribune, July 3, 1994, sec. E. The article was a selection 
o f excerpts from letters preserved by the Northern Indiana Historical Society. On a side note, John Hardin 
Schutt was a distant relative o f the author.
152 Alotta, Civil War Justice, 68.
153 Rosenblatt, ed., 179.
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while the act may have had a “salutary effect” for discipline, “there were some 
unnecessarily revolting circumstances connected with the execution of this sentence, that 
made it a scene to be put out of one’s mind and forgotten.” Fiske continued his story by 
questioning the actions of the government in this “scene of butchery” as the event had 
been marred by poor planning and inadequate resources: “If such things are to be done in 
the future, the arrangements may be perfected beforehand so as to avoid a like 
bungling.”154 The circumstances of the execution, intended by the government to justify 
military discipline, were so awful that soldiers hoped to push them from their minds.
Numerous other accounts suggest that Northern soldiers were frequently unnerved 
by the violent death of their comrades at the hand of the government. The reactions of 
these soldiers reflected the cultural trends described by Spierenburg and Masur, for 
Northerners often rejected the penalty because they believed it would be brutalizing 
rather than beneficial for witnesses. Given the acceptance of an equally violent death for 
soldiers convicted of murder, the opinions of these men suggest that Northern soldiers 
actually disguised a larger issue when they expressed disgust for deserter executions. In 
fact, many soldiers who admitted queasiness when watching the firing squads were truly 
speaking out against the punishment for people accused only of desertion.
As Foucault argues, the power of the state was literally written on the body of the 
dead victim. Therefore, when soldiers expressed disgust with the ceremony, they were 
ultimately opposing the very apparatus of discipline. If they were simply upset at public 
executions in general, more Union soldiers would be appalled when a murderer was 
hanged to death in camp. But the truly visceral reactions to death only surfaced in the
154 Stephen Sears, ed., Mr. Dunn Browne’s Experiences in the Army: The Civil War Letters o f  Samuel W. 
Fiske (New York: Fordham University Press, 1998), 170-171.
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record when the victim was a deserter. Thus, soldiers (and many civilians) were rejecting 
the authority of the state to execute a man simply for desertion and implicitly arguing that 
government did not have the right to control citizens in such a manner.155
As the war continued and more extreme measures were taken against deserters, 
men and women in the North struck back at the federal government and military and 
denied their right to discipline the unruly bodies of deserters. Some couched their 
criticism in terms of legality. The editors of the Advocate fo r Peace, already opposed to 
warfare, found capital punishment of soldiers to be another example of the government 
using its power to support cruelty. The writers claimed that governments do not have 
“the right to use all the force necessary for the support of [their] authority.” In fact, they 
noted how some persons felt that when one was sentenced to “the gallows, [the 
government] in such acts make[s] war upon the offenders.”156 Though shying away from 
accusing Americans of drastic war crimes as the Advocate for Peace had, the editors of 
the New York Times also questioned capital punishment. Specifically, one article 
challenged the opinion of the editors of the Troy Daily Times that a mass execution by 
General McNeil in Missouri was warranted. McNeil killed his victims with undo 
authority, for in this case, “neither [the condemned]’s character nor their infamous deeds 
had anything to do with their execution.” The death of these men was nothing more than 
“a killing, without trial, without even an accusation of crime” that could not be “justified
155 O f course, not all soldiers rejected the principle o f executions. After witnessing several deaths, John 
Westervelt concluded in April, 1864 that the punishments were deserved, as “Uncle Sam has been to [s/c] 
lenient with such traitors all through the war so far.” However, the vast majority o f those who ostensibly 
supported such punishment did so, like Westervelt implies, for practical reasons. As the rest o f this paper 
makes clear, many who supported the executions still denied that the government should wield that 
authority. See Anna Palladino, ed., Diary o f  a Yankee Engineer: The Civil War Story o f  John H.
Westervelt, Engineer, Ist New York Volunteer Engineer Corps (New York: Fordham University Press,
1997), 126.
156 “The Enforcement o f Law Not War,” Advocate o f  Peace, March/ April 1863, www.proquest.com/
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by any recognized rules of war.”157 These journalists believed in certain reprisals, but 
expressed outrage at the military for going beyond the legitimate limits of its authority.
The most common complaint concerning executions, and the one with the most
profound effect, dealt with the role of the state in preventing desertion. Perhaps no one
was more conflicted in his loyalties to home and government than Private John
Pardington of the 24 Michigan, a soldier in the famed Iron Brigade. As evidenced in
many of his letters home, this soldier believed in his duty to the government and the
cause for which he fought, including complete loyalty to the army. After witnessing the
effect of a court martial and subsequent punishment, Pardington wrote his wife,
expressing disgust at the actions of the deserters:
Sarah before I would under go the same as they did I would 
sooner be brought home in my coffin to you as bad as I 
want to see you dear I never could desert. Sarah I never 
could Bring such disgrace on you and my little darling.158
Pardington’s comments condemned those whom he felt had betrayed the cause.
However, events soon took place that shook Pardington’s resolve. A week after
witnessing the punishment of deserters in his own unit, Pardington was shocked to learn
that his wife’s brother, William Knapp, had deserted his unit and returned home to stay
with the family. Pardington wrote to his wife in disbelief, first trying to assert the priority
of the war, but quickly settling into a debate with himself about the limits of one’s
allegiance to the state:
I heard about your Brothers desertions. I think he ought to 
be ashamed of himself. Others are situated just as he is.
But I supposed he must see his wife. What kind of a
157 “The Missouri Executions Again,” New York Times, December 4, 1862, www.proquest.com/
158 John H. Pardington to Sarah Pardington, 21 February 1863, Lassen, ed., 77.
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reception would mine give me if i should do the same.
(But never)159
The young husband could condemn William’s action while at the same time wishing he 
could follow in his footsteps.
Soon afterwards Pardington wrote his father, clearly troubled by his brother-in- 
law’s desertion, and discussed nationalism and the debilitating effects of army life. He 
confessed that he had thought William’s “Patriotism would soon die out. It dont last long 
in the army.”160 Shortly before he was killed at the battle of Gettysburg, however, 
Pardington seems to have come to a decision regarding desertion. As he told his wife, 
“There [are] 3 or 4 men to be shot in our Corp for desertion on the 5 of this 
month.. ..Any man that will desert his countrys flag at this Hour of Peril Deserves to be 
shot.”161 Although he ultimately decided that the state’s execution of deserters was just, 
Pardington’s personal trials and doubts reflect the truly complicated ways that soldiers 
and civilians wrestled with conflicting loyalties during the Civil War. Pardington 
claimed to agree with the government’s actions in executing soldiers for desertion, but 
never thought of such a penalty for his own kin, not to mention his own flirtations with 
running for home.
It has already been shown that the state hoped to curb the vast problem of 
desertion and that soldiers like Pardington understood the necessity of stemming the tide. 
However, many persons, when faced with the dreadful sight of an execution, voiced their 
opinion that desertion simply did not justify such an extreme penalty. Susan Eppes lived 
in a town near an army camp and made a habit of conversing with the soldiers. One day,
159 John H. Pardington to Sarah Pardington, 6 March 1863, Lassen, ed., 84.
160 John H. Pardington to Father, Lassen, ed., 89.
161 John H. Pardington to Sarah Pardington, 3 June 1863, Lassen, ed., 124.
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however, she “regretted her friendly glance.. .because while she was looking ‘the squad 
fired and the deserters fell dead.’” Eppes was outraged over the incident, saying that she 
“‘didn’t think it ought to be done. So many are killed in battle and lives are worth more 
than that.”’ She believed the government’s action was too harsh, for “maybe, she
1 A 9worried, they had ‘meant to come back.’”
Many others echoed Eppes’ assessment of deserters; as Confederate General 
Edward Porter Alexander noted, one prisoner “did not intend to desert for good and all,
1 A^but only to go to see his folks for a bit -  and may be a sweetheart.” Particularly early 
in the war, newspapers included confessions of condemned prisoners; one expressed the 
notion that his desertion was intended to be useful to the Northern army: “I thought that I 
could ride.. .go and see my mother in New Orleans, stay for a few weeks in the South, 
and then be able to get back to our regiment again, perhaps with some valuable 
information.”164 This man felt that his desertion did not warrant his death. Other Union 
soldiers agreed that deserters did not deserve the ultimate punishment. When Joseph 
Sharp ran from the ranks, the regiment’s historian recorded that many men blamed 
Corporal Julius Davis for “‘informing against his comrade’” and “‘accused him of
162 Marten, ed., 169. Unfortunately, the source does not indicate where Ms. Eppes resided at the time o f the 
incident. Presumably she was somewhere in the South, as the armies spent the majority o f their time below  
the Mason-Dixon Line. The source also does not indicate what army she was watching, though it could 
have been either Union or Confederate.
163 Gary Gallagher, ed., Fighting fo r  the Confederacy: The Personal Recollections o f  General Edward 
Porter Alexander (Chapel Hill: University o f North Carolina Press, 1989), 196. Although Alexander was a 
Confederate officer and thus technically outside the scope of this work, his opinion reflected that of some 
less-eloquent and less-quotable Union officers.
164 “The Execution o f Johnson,” http://app.harpweek.com/
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betraying a friendly confidant solely for selfish gain.”’165 These men expressed a widely 
held notion that desertion did not merit such an extreme punishment.166
For some Americans in both army and civil life, imprisonment seemed the more 
sensible and effective punishment for deserters. In early 1864, Colonel R. F. Mawry of 
the 1st Oregon Cavalry asked his commanding officer to commute the sentence of Private 
Francis Ely. Ely had been “‘an exemplary soldier’” who had made a mistake and 
deserted his unit. Colonel Mawry believed that “the ‘proceedings of the court & the 
approval of commutation on me of execution will have an effect equal to the execution of 
the sentence.’”167 The Rev. G. F. Krotel made a similar argument concerning the 
convicted deserter William Howe, whom he had been sent to console before death.
Private Howe, “who [had] volunteered as a soldier of the Union, and conducted himself 
bravely” was now a “humbled man ... who [had] learned the bitter lessons of long 
imprisonment,” argued Rev. Krotel in a letter to President Lincoln. Like Colonel Mawry,
Rev. Krotel understood that desertion necessarily led to the “stem demands of justice,”
168but was convinced that the death penalty was simply not the proper punishment. Both 
Mawry and Krotel, obviously aware of what the spectacle of an execution would entail, 
felt that they had to speak out against a penalty they saw as unjust.
165 Alotta, Civil War Justice, 157.
166 At the same time that many soldiers felt like the government was exerting too much authority in 
executing deserters, many of these same men castigated the state for not doing enough to stem the reasons 
fo r  the high desertion rates. Interestingly, these persons often suggested the very action they deplored 
using against their own comrades — death. George Cram wrote that he hoped “every copperhead rascal was 
hung,” clearly blaming the Peace Democrats for desertion. Samuel Fiske expressed a similar thought when 
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Bohmstedt, ed., Soldiering with Sherman: Civil War Letters o f  George F. Cram (DeKalb: Northern Illinois 
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167 Alotta, Civil War Justice, 103. Mawry’s commanding officer disagreed with the colonel, and Private 
Ely was shot March 11, 1864.
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Some of the most telling evidence of persons rejecting the death penalty comes 
from the victims themselves. Obviously the prospect of death was trying on the men, but 
many chose to use their final moments to defy the power of the government and military. 
Chaplain John Bowles recorded a poignant encounter with Private Wallace Baker, an 
African-American soldier sentenced to the “extreme penalty of the law.”169 Baker saw 
his death as a crime of the government, one for whom he had sacrificed a great deal; as 
Chaplain Bowles recorded: “Said he, ‘I came out here to fight the rebels and I would not 
mind being killed in battle, but I don’t want to be murdered by my own side.’”170 
Baker’s choice of the term “murder” likely stemmed in part from the awful stress of the 
moment, but it also implicates the state in his death. In a similar case, Private William 
Dowdy was convicted of being absent without leave while his unit traveled towards 
battle. One of his comrades noted that Dowdy told his companions “that if anyone 
wanted to desert he did not care when they went as lief [sic] they would go one time as 
another.. .he would not blame the men for leaving for they were not treated as soldiers 
might be treated in several respects.”171 Dowdy questioned the role of the military in
169 The execution o f black soldiers presents numerous other questions that are beyond the scope o f this 
study. The racial attitudes o f persons both North and South often led to more severe penalties for African- 
Americans than for their white counterparts. As William Seraile notes, black soldiers were more quickly 
reprimanded and often judged unfairly by authorities. African-Americans were more liable to “drum-head 
court martials,” speedy trials on the spot with immediate punishment. Moreover, as Robert Alotta has 
recognized, blacks were disproportionately indicted for crimes such as rape and mutiny. Private William 
Johnson (not to be confused with the first soldier executed for desertion) was hung during a truce at 
Petersburg in between the trenches, so that Confederates and Union soldiers alike could witness the 
penalty. He had been charged with desertion, but also with attempting “outrages” upon a white woman. 
Thus, blacks were more likely to be hung (deemed a more ignominious death) than shot by firing squad. 
While some works have commented upon the deaths o f black soldiers at the hands o f the enemy, the role o f  
race in Civil War executions has yet to be studied extensively. For general information, see William 
Seraile, New York’s Black Regiments during the Civil War, Studies in African American History and 
Culture (New York: Routledge, 2001).
170 Noah Andre Trudeau, ed., Voices o f  the 55th: Letters from the 55th Massachusetts Volunteers, 1861-1865 
(Dayton, OH: Momingside House, Inc., 1996), 223-225.
171 Alotta, Civil War Justice, 129. Dowdy was convicted o f desertion without ever once leaving the 
steamboat his unit was riding.
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keeping men at arms, an extension of control over his freedom that he could not abide. 
Some men went well beyond words in their opposition to government authority. Hiram 
Oliver and John Hartup had deserted the Union army and then killed the official sent to
i n>j
arrest and return them to duty. These two men, while obviously saving their own 
hides, acted to defy the power of the state over their lives in the strongest manner 
possible.173
While some men took extreme measures to resist their personal punishments, 
other individuals attempted to correct the very system responsible for what they saw as a
• • * thflawed use of military discipline. By June 1864, Lt. Edmund Randall of the 116 
Pennsylvania had become so frustrated by the treatment of some deserters that he took his 
feelings directly to President Lincoln. Lt. Randall, the appointed attorney for the deserter 
Private William Howe, sat down with the President and vociferously attacked the flaws in 
procedure in his client’s case, meanwhile hinting at more widespread abuses within the 
court martial system. Lt. Randall noted that the judges had refused to let Howe 
“‘examine the challenged member on his oath as to his qualifications to sit on the trial ... 
(as was his undoubted right).’”174 Moreover, two other judges had sat on Howe’s 
previous trial for desertion, the verdict of which had been set aside because of informality 
during the court martial. Lt. Randall concluded from these facts that, given the “irregular 
and illegal” proceedings of the trial, that “‘the Prisoner was deprived o f that full, fa ir
172 “Military Execution at Camp Chase,” H arper’s Weekly, September 23, 1865, http://app.harpweek.com/
173 In what may be an anecdotal story, one condemned deserter supposedly used the force o f his morality to 
cause others to question the legitimacy his execution. Witnesses contend that this Quaker soldier “was 
ordered to be shot, and when the file o f soldiers who were to execute the sentence saw the victim and heard 
him calmly praying that they might be forgiven for their involuntary crime, they refused to fire.” The 
author o f this statement was presenting the case o f conscientious objectors, but flatly denied their right to 
excuse themselves from duty, stating that they should “acknowledge the necessity o f government or o f 
authority.” See “Quaker Exemption,” H arper’s Weekly, February 27, 1864, http://app.harpweek.com/
174 Alotta, Stop the Evil, 150-151. Emphasis in original.
69
impartial investigation o f his case, that law & justice allows him.”’175 Although he
challenged the method of Private Howe’s court martial, Lt. Randall still agreed that
desertion was a serious enough crime to warrant punishment—but not death. He urged
President Lincoln to exercise his clemency in commuting the sentence from death to
imprisonment,’”176 Tellingly, Private Howe’s lawyer was also supported in a concurring
letter from nine current and former officers in the brigade.177 Lt. Randall’s objections
were drawn specifically from one prisoner’s case, but his arguments pass judgment over
the entire apparatus of military discipline.178
While Lt. Randall questioned the legality of how some deserters were tried and
convicted, newspaper correspondent J. R. Hamilton condemned the army’s recruiting
system for creating conditions that would inevitably lead to desertion—and unnecessary
executions. In December 1864, Hamilton penned a dispatch from City Point, Virginia,
that opened with a concern he understood to be on the minds of many Americans: “Every
few days, of late, the country has been shocked by the intelligence of three or four men at
a time dying the death of dogs ... for the crime of desertion.”179 According to this
observer, these shocking executions would be for the most part unnecessary but for a
greater evil plaguing the army. In fact:
good and loyal people, everywhere, would be horrified 
beyond measure, if  they only knew through what a hideous 
mass of peculation and corruption, among officials in
175 Alotta, Stop the Evil, 151.
176 Ibid.
177 Ibid. According to Alotta, two o f these officers in particular, Col. St. Clair A. Mulholland and Adj. 
Lewis J. Sacriste, were rising stars within the army. To have such men oppose the army’s decisions 
regarding punishment showed the degree o f their convictions concerning the death penalty. See Alotta,
Stop the Evil, 171-172.
178 Unfortunately for Private Howe, Lt. Randall’s arguments did not sway the authorities. Private Howe 
was executed August 26, 1864.
179 “Desertions From Our Army,” New York Times, January 2, 1865, www.proquest.com/
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positions of trust, the fate of each of these miserable
180wretches has culminated at the gallows.
Hamilton goes on to explain that substitute brokers, “aided, of course, by boards of 
enrollment, examining physicians, &c., (without whose guilty connivance they could not
1 O 1
act),” were sending the army thousands of unfit recruits. Due to this corruption, young 
boys, blind and disabled men, criminals, mentally-unfit persons, and foreigners of many 
stripes swelled into the Union camps. Hamilton was incredulous: How could such 
individuals not be expected to desert when it was “impossible to drill and instruct [them] 
in the duties of a soldier?” he asked.182 In his assessment, such a deeply rooted issue 
could not be solved by simply executing deserters. “It is to be feared that a complete cure 
must be sought deeper yet,” lectured Hamilton; nothing less than a complete overhaul of 
the system of substitutes and recruiting was necessary to eliminate desertion, not just 
more firing squads.183 This correspondent was aware of the power of the death penalty, 
but believed that it was increasingly being used to hide more fundamental and
184widespread flaws in the military’s apparatus, failings he could not abide.
The widespread rejection of state authority is perhaps most clear in the case of 
two soldiers executed for refusing to join a new consolidated regiment. In early 
September 1863, a military commission was organized in Thibodeaux, Louisiana, to 
investigate the shooting of two privates from the Second Rhode Island Cavalry just a 
week earlier. Lieutenant Colonel Harai Robinson of the First Louisiana Cavalry had been
180 “Desertions From Our Army,” www.proquest.com/
181 Ibid. Substitute brokers rounded up men for the army to take the place o f more affluent Northerners in 
the Federal draft. Also, it should be noted, as mentioned in Chapter I, that the examining physicians were 
under the sway o f the Union Provost Marshal by this point in the war.
182 Ibid.
183 Ibid.
184 Ibid. Hamilton did come away clearly affected by the spectacle o f the execution, a sight he described as 
both “impressive” and “horrible.”
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ordered to incorporate the remnants of the Rhode Island unit into his own regiment, a 
practice increasingly common within the army as battle casualties decimated regiments. 
Col. Robinson encountered unexpected resistance to his orders, however, when the 
Rhode Island officers told him, as he recounted the event to the commission, that “in their 
opinion [Robinson] should never be able to do anything with their men” and “as they
1 RSunderstood [the order], they themselves were already discharged the service.” The 
enlisted men stood with their officers as Robinson recalled a murmur of dissent when he 
read the order o f consolidation. These individuals considered their service to the United 
States complete. Specifically, Robinson noted that two privates arose and “used the 
following language, or words to this effect: ‘Colonel, we have made up our minds that, as 
we enlisted [in the] Second Rhode Island Cavalry, we will, by God, serve in no 
other.’”186 These soldiers had volunteered to serve their country and state, but vocally 
rejected any effort to force them into a different unit.
Unfortunately for these privates, several Rhode Islanders had picked that very 
morning to make a more physical and permanent statement of their position—they 
deserted the camp. Nothing in the record indicates that the deserters were captured to 
face punishment, but Col. Robinson, determined that “some decisive action was
187necessary,” chose to make an example of other soldiers by proxy. Col. Robinson 
summarily commissioned one of his officers as a “provost-marshal of the day” and 
charged him with “the execution of Private Richard Murphy, Boston alias Richard Smith, 
and of Private Frederick Freeman, alias William Davis, mutineers—a military
1S5 OR, Ser. I, Vol. XXVI, Pt. 1, pg. 262.
186 Ibid., 263.
187 Ibid.
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necessity.”188 The regiment was immediately assembled, and the two ringleaders were 
bound and led out before the men. According to the transcript of the commission, they 
were shot to death within half an hour of the very first rumblings from the soldiers.
Despite the general acceptance of the death penalty among the military officer 
corps, such a rapid execution raised questions of propriety and prompted an investigation. 
The military commission, after accepting Col. Robinson’s testimony, began a very telling 
line of questioning. In its first query, the court asked the colonel whether “that part of the 
First Louisiana Cavalry which was formerly the Second Rhode Island Cavalry, since the 
execution of two of its members, [had] shown any disposition to mutiny?” Robinson 
responded tersely: “None in the least.”189 The court seemed far more concerned with the 
practical consequences of the execution than with the ethical implications of hastily 
shooting two men to death. The commission’s examination of Robinson’s subordinate 
officers followed a similar line. Lieutenant Edward Hall was given leading questions to 
ensure that the death penalty would look like the only acceptable remedy for the 
situation. Rather than asking Hall to justify the punishment of these specific privates, the 
court was only concerned with the implications of their deaths:
Question: What quelled [the dissent]?
Answer: Shooting two of the ringleaders on the spot.190
For the military authorities, the execution of Murphy and Freeman was exactly what Col. 
Robinson declared it to be in his order—a military necessity. The only important 
concerns to the court were whether the integrity of military discipline was preserved by 
the action, not which men were killed or even if  they “deserved” their fate. Unruly
188 OR, Ser. I, Vol. XXVI, Pt. 1, pg. 263.
189 Ibid., 264.
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bodies like Murphy and Freeman (not to mention nearly all of the officers and enlisted 
men of the Second Rhode Island Cavalry) were a threat to the control of all soldiers and 
therefore their blindfolded and bound bodies were transformed into examples of state 
power.
After questioning a number of persons in the First Louisiana Cavalry, the 
commission returned its findings on the incident. The court concluded, rather succinctly, 
that “the suppression of the mutiny was in the prompt and efficient manner in which the 
ringleaders were executed.”191 However, not every person associated with this event 
accepted the executions without question. Clearly, the Rhode Island soldiers were 
angered at the actions taken against their comrades. But more prominent figures soon 
challenged whether the situation recounted in the court transcript truly consituted a 
“military necessity.” The first criticism came from within the army itself from General 
Nathaniel Banks, commander of the district. Gen. Banks was responsible for forwarding 
the details of the trial to authorities in Washington with his assessment of the actions.
His subsequent “indorsement” of the proceedings can only be described as ambivalent at 
best:
It is probable that order could have been maintained in the 
regiment without the application of capital punishment to 
the two men executed; but the conduct of the Second 
Rhode Island Cavalry was such that it is impossible to say
192how soon the mutiny would have been repeated.
OR, Ser. I, Vol. XXVI, Pt. 1, pg. 268.
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Ultimately, Banks bowed to the disciplinary needs of the army, but his analysis of the 
situation, even when drawn only from the biased court transcript, suggests that even some 
military figures did not always agree with the death penalty in particular instances.
The controversy over the execution of Privates Murphy and Freeman soon 
expanded beyond the ranks of the army. When he received word of the two victims, the 
governor of Rhode Island, James Smith, wrote to Secretary of War Edwin Stanton with 
his opinion o f the matter. Governor Smith’s analysis truly questions the limits of the 
federal government’s authority. After critiquing the reorganization of the Second Rhode 
Island, Smith tells Stanton that he has heard that two men were shot “for simply 
remonstrating against the order of consolidation.”193 Smith’s skeptical tone soon 
transforms into anger: “I fell [s/c] it my duty to inform you, sir, that our people consider 
the order in question of much injury to the service, and an outrage to Rhode Island.”194 
The governor invoked the presumed ire of his citizens, whom he believed saw the 
execution as an affront to honor. Moreover, Smith notes that his population believes that 
such shootings actually damage army discipline and morale. He concludes his letter with 
a question for Stanton that strikes at the heart of the matter: “What assurances can we 
given [sic] officers or recruits from this State that they will be protected in their rights if  
they are to be so summarily death [sic], without even a show of justice?”195 Smith’s 
simple inquiry reveals a man with significant doubts about the integrity of the military 
disciplinary system. The Republican governor, no doubt a firm Unionist and friend of the 
administration’s aims, believed that the federal government and its army had overstepped
193 OR, Ser. I, Vol. XXVI, Pt. 1, pg. 271.
194 T U - *
75
the limits of their legitimate control. More importantly, he acted as a spokesman for 
Rhode Island citizens who rejected the executions of men by the very government they 
served.
The Union army and Northern government were making a statement about their 
power over the citizens of America when they shot men for deserting the flag. The 
ceremony of death was meant to transform the body of a condemned victim into an 
emblem of state authority for all to see and fear. When soldiers on the march and 
civilians at home wrote to one another and spoke out against the state-sanctioned murder 
of deserters, they too were making a statement. By questioning the legitimacy of these 
executions, Northerners were actually imposing their own limits on the power of the 
government and military in their lives. At the same time that the necessities of the Civil 
War allowed the state to intrude more into the lives of Americans and exert more control 
over their bodies, many persons opposed the increased discipline. They signalled their 
disagreement by opposing the most visual sign of such discipline—the execution of 
deserters.
EPILOGUE
THE STATE RESPONDS
As Americans came to oppose the state-sanctioned murder of deserters, they 
sought out ways of making their opinions heard. Nevertheless, the case of one young 
New York private charged with desertion was particularly unusual for the day. Yankee 
Engineer John Westervelt related that this “deserter and bounty jumper.. .would have 
been shot but through the intercession of Capt Cruso and his mother he was 
released.. .and is with our Co at present.”196 Few soldiers sentenced to death had the luck 
of such arbitration; moreover, few Northerners at home could directly influence the 
military in regards to capital punishment like this young private’s mother. However, as 
the preceding chapter demonstrates, many Union soldiers and civilians believed that the 
government did not have the legitimate authority to execute deserters. As the desertion 
rate increased, this opinion spread even more rapidly and, in some instances, actually 
forced the state to mitigate its policies. Few intercessions with the military were as 
personal as the incident related above, but the strength of public opinion against deserter 
executions did compel the state to institute checks on its own policies.
Even as the records generally show a government and military firmly committed 
to punishing an unfortunate few for the larger goal of stemming desertion, several 
comments and actions betray the subtle ways that Americans, particularly civilians at 
home, could act to limit the state’s authority. One of the war’s most intelligent observers,
196 Palladino, ed., 166-7.
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General William Tecumseh Sherman, noted with a hint of disgust that he could not carry 
out all the punishments he had hoped for, as “Times are changed since our present 
military code was enacted.. ..now Public opinion General or Local is the ruling Power & 
must be denominated Law.”197 This astute commander recognized that his attempts to 
execute larger numbers of deserters, though acceptable to military tribunals, would not be 
condoned in the court of public opinion.
General Darius Couch recognized that civilian fears about the military’s treatment 
of deserters could actually lead to outright opposition to the government. While 
presiding over Pennsylvania late in the war, Gen. Couch warned officials about the 
residents of Columbia County. This heavily Democratic area was so restless that some 
observers called it the “Fishing Creek Confederacy,” and Couch believed the civilians 
were sufficiently upset at the army’s policies that they could actually rise up in armed 
rebellion. The general quickly understood at least one source of the citizens’ frustrations: 
the severe treatment of deserters. In response, he offered a pardon to all deserters in the
198area and even delayed the execution of Private William Howe as a “ ‘humane’ gesture.”
As this scenario shows, the opinions of everyday Americans, increasingly against the 
capital punishment of deserters, had an impact on government and military officials.
Other generals were less cognizant of the people’s demands and how they limited 
the government’s authority. General William Rosecrans, bemoaning the rising rate of 
desertion, demanded that he be given “the power of confirming and promptly executing
197 William T. Sherman to Ethan Allen Hitchcock, 25 January 1863, Brooks Simpson and Jean Berlin, eds., 
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198 Alotta, Stop the Evil, 173.
78
sentence of death for desertion.”199 General-in-Chief Halleck shared Rosecrans’ desire, 
but refused the officer’s request. He replied sternly: “The law is positive that no such 
sentence shall be executed till approved by the President. The President cannot change 
this law, and it is his duty, as well as yours and mine, to obey the law.” Halleck confided 
to Rosecrans that he had urged Congress to repeal this new law, but the people’s 
representatives had not budged. Moreover, Halleck cautioned Rosecrans that visible 
efforts to round up deserters would likely fail, and would in fact “weaken rather than 
strengthen the numbers of your army, besides the risks of conflict between the civil 
authorities and indiscreet officers sent on that service.”200 As the General-in-Chiefs 
comment makes clear, soldiers responded negatively to the efforts to round up deserters, 
as did citizens back home. These factors pressured the army to proceed cautiously, 
showing that the public could in fact resist the efforts of the army to discipline them.
The official records indicate a similar understanding by other military brass, even 
members of the Provost Marshal’s office, ostensibly the standard bearers for discipline. 
General James Oakes, Provost Marshal in Illinois, felt that the government had lost an 
opportunity early in the war by not acting decisively enough against deserters. He 
claimed that at the start of the conflict the public whole-heartedly approved of executions, 
asserting that “all the people would have said amen, and the crime of desertion, except in
OR, Ser. I, Vol. XXIII, Pt. 2, pg. 75.
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rare instances, would have ceased.” As the situation now stood, however, Oakes believed 
that “penalties [had] come to be disregarded and despised” by the public.201 Even if 
Oakes’ assessment about the early sentiment in the war is accurate, he admits to Union 
authorities that the American public would not then submit to such executions as he 
deemed necessary. Another Union official, reflecting upon the conflicting loyalties of 
home and army life, recommended that certain forms of desertion be categorized 
differently and correspondingly punished in a manner other than execution. Major 
Young suggested that “desertion to enemy or across Confederate lines” be treated 
according to regulations, “punishable with death by shooting.” On the other hand, 
recognizing the powerful ties many soldiers had to their homes and families, Young
encouraged the army to give those merely guilty of “overstaying leave until arrest” or
_“desertion to home” a sentence of imprisonment, not death. The government and 
military understood that the public’s opinion mattered and subsequently acted to curtail 
their own authority in regards to executions.
Lawmakers were also listening to their constituents’ qualms with capital 
punishment for deserters and responding with legislation. As early as December 1862, 
members of Congress were calling for reform of the way deserters were punished. 
According to the New York Times, one politician had “given notice of his intention to 
bring a bill, giving soldiers and officers convicted by Courts-martial the right to appeal 
... and giving the President the power of ordering a new trial.”203 The New York Times 
actually belittled the proposition, claiming the necessity of stricter rules in the military. 
However, the very fact that a member of Congress believed that reform was necessary
201 OR, Ser. Ill, Vol. V, Pt. 1, pg. 833.
202 OR, Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, Pt. 2, pg. 1300.
203 “Military Law for Military Camps,” New York Times, December 22, 1862, www.proquest.com/
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within the army’s system of discipline suggests that many Americans had doubts about 
the severity of military law.
The Civil War’s most recognizable politician was also the figure most strongly 
affected by the American public’s aversion to death penalties for desertion. Although 
Abraham Lincoln signed off on dozens of individual cases, formally sending men in front 
of the firing squads, his writings also reflect the conflicting needs of war and regard for 
mercy. Lincoln asked all of his generals to send him the details of each prisoner awaiting 
execution, which allowed him to delay or even commute the sentence of many men. As 
he said in early 1864, he commuted the sentence of one particular deserter “ ‘because I am 
trying to avoid the butchering business lately.’”204 Lincoln’s personal antipathy towards 
some executions was intimately tied to the causes of desertion. He decried the actions of 
Copperheads and others antagonistic to the war effort who pushed men to leave the ranks. 
“Must I shoot a simple-minded soldier boy who deserts while I must not touch a hair of a 
wily agitator who induces him to desert?” Lincoln wrote. Was desertion not encouraged 
by persons at home, “a father or brother or friend.. .working upon his feelings until he is 
persuaded to write to the soldier boy” persuading him to run? The president felt that in
205these situations, to “save the boy is not only constitutional but with all a great mercy.”
Responding to Democratic senators who had come to ask Lincoln to pardon
certain Indiana deserters, the president summarized why he and many other Americans
felt that the state should limit its authority in the case of particular executions:
‘The death penalty is one of the most difficult questions 
with which I have to deal. When a soldier deserts to go 
over to the enemy and is captured, I let the law take its 
course, but when a man has been a long time in the service,
2U4 Long, 453.
205 OR, Ser. II, Vol. VI, Pt. 1, pg. 8.
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and has not had a furlough, and who, when on picket, gets 
to thinking of his wife and children and breaks for tall
9 O f *timber, I never let them hurt a hair on his head.’
Lincoln understood that soldiers and their families faced hardship during the Civil War, 
and he worked to restrain the military’s executions except in the most aggravated cases. 
Towards the end of the conflict, the president went so far as to commute the sentences of 
all Union deserters scheduled for execution at that point “to imprisonment at the Dry 
Tortugas during the war.”207 Although some military commanders judged him weak for 
his actions, Lincoln accurately reflected the ways in which Northern men and women 
viewed capital punishment for desertion. Even though many believed it necessary as an 
example, Americans questioned the bounds of government and military authority in the 
case of desertions and, to a small extent, succeeded in curbing the state’s power to 
execute its own soldiers.
In a large number of cases, however, the many calls for an end to the executions 
of deserters fell on deaf ears.208 As Foucault demonstrates, the very nature of a public 
execution automatically triggered an identification with the victim rather than the state. 
Undaunted, the government and military pressed on with their court martials and
206 “Lincoln and Indiana,” New York Times, December 28, 1882, www.proquest.com/. This quote is 
attributed to the president by former Senator J. E. McDonald. Lincoln was assassinated before he was able 
to pardon the two Indianans who took part in a deserters gang known as the Sons o f Liberty. However, his 
successor, Andrew Johnson, saw fit to fulfill Lincoln’s promise. See “Respite o f the Indiana Conspirators,” 
New York Times, May 17, 1865, www.proquest.com/
207 “Army and Navy Items,” H arper’s Weekly, March 19, 1864, http://app.harpweek.com/. The Dry 
Tortugas is an island at the western edge o f the Florida Keys. During the Civil War, the Union army 
maintained a base there, Fort Jefferson, that was used to house captured deserters. Lincoln’s proclamation 
actually went into effect on February 26, 1864; despite his announcement, many more men died at the 
hands o f Union authorities for desertion, even after the war was over.
208 Although originating in the Confederacy, Secretary of War James Seddon’s letter to “Mrs. Sarah E. 
Howenton and Other Ladies” is more typical o f both governments’ responses to cries against executions. 
Amidst a smattering o f nineteenth century sexism, Seddon suggests that the womens’ “petition in behalf o f 
the deserters from the Army” was heartfelt, but that “the rigid enforcement of the death penalty, painful and 
distressing as it naturally is to the feelings, is in reality the course o f humanity, and by preventing offenses 
in the end saves lives.” Despite such records, Union laws and policy changes reveal that the opinions o f the 
public did make a difference, if  only a small one. See OR, Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, Pt. 1, pg. 524.
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spectacles of death. In fact, as many as six men were executed by the North for desertion 
even after General Lee surrendered the Army of Northern Virginia and Jefferson Davis’ 
capture signalled the end of the Confederate rebellion.209 Over American history to that 
point, desertion had been punishable by death only during times of war, but the 
machinery of discipline was already in place. The state, determined to preserve its 
newfound authority, refused to halt the process. As a result, several unfortunate men
91 nwere shot for leaving the ranks even though there was no one left to fight.
To some extent, the executions of deserters served a parallel function with the 
establishment of rigid control over soldiers’ bodies. At a very simple level, the gruesome 
violence of war “made death familiar and gave rise to rituals intended to integrate it, to 
make it acceptable and to give a meaning to its permanent aggression.”211 In essence, the 
shooting of a deserter, deemed a criminal by the authorities, was meant to inure soldiers
2J2to the barbarity of war. At the same time, the executed prisoners were held up as proof
of the necessity of continued conflict where only great discipline could win the day. This 
intent was particularly true for a civil war, where the enemy was not always seen as so
209 Alotta, Civil War Justice, 208-9. Two o f these men, John Willis o f the 52nd Infantry, USCT and Otto 
Pierce o f the 5th Heavy Artillery, USCT were African-Americans. Although their only listed crime was 
desertion these men were made to suffer the indignity o f a hanging rather than the firing squad.
210 While the actual desertion had taken place during a time o f war, these prisoners were held and made to 
suffer their punishment. Some were kept even after the rest o f their unit had been discharged and returned 
home.
211 Foucault, 55.
212 On a side note, the executions o f soldiers were powerful enough to become ingrained in the psyche o f  
many Americans, just as the state intended. For instance, when a newspaper reported shortly after the war 
concluded that fifteen men had died by scalding in a boat accident, the headline stated that the soldiers had 
suffered an “Execution by Steam.” See “Execution by Steam,” New York Times, June 24, 1865, 
www.proquest.com/. Other efforts to integrate death into the normal context o f the Civil War included the 
largest execution ever in American history, 38 persons, in Mankato, Minnesota. These Native Americans 
were tagged as participants in the Sioux uprising o f 1862 and hanged the day after Christmas, 1862. See 
Long, 301. For more information see John Bessler, Legacy o f  Violence: Lynch Mobs and Executions in 
Minnesota (Minneapolis: University o f Minnesota Press, 2003). Military leaders took still more radical 
actions. Some went so far as to sweep the countryside, murdering those suspected o f any disloyal 
sentiment. See Leslie Gordon, General George E. Pickett in Life and Legend (Chapel Hill: University o f  
North Carolina Press, 1998) for a particularly notorious example. Obviously, such actions did not integrate 
death into everyday life, but merely stoked the fires o f  discontent amongst the American public.
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different and loyalties were often unclear. Deserters straddled many such boundaries, so 
the state murdered them in an attempt to reinforce its command of American citizens and 
ensure their support for the war.
It is equally clear that many Northerners ultimately rejected these efforts. Rather 
than rallying behind the government when the military shot deserters, Union men and 
women increasingly saw these incidents as immoral and even illegal. As the war raged 
on, Americans came to oppose such executions, sharing these sentiments in letters, 
articles, and action. When Northerners challenged the validity of capital punishment, 
they were not simply arguing against the death of individual deserters. In fact, these 
persons were contesting the new levels of authority over their lives symbolized by the 
execution of a deserter. When men were bound and blindfolded and shot by their 
comrades, it was only a very tangible and poignant example of how the state was 
attempting to exert its discipline over American citizens. During the Civil War, 
Northerners rejected the state’s authority and, in the end, forced the government and 
military to listen.
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